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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
For many years, a great deal of conflict and 
closed-minded bias has existed between the traditional 
intrapsychic and behavioral orientations in psychology. 
The former group tended to focus almost exclusively on 
internal determinants of behavior, while the latter group 
emphasized external factors. However, contemporary psy-
chology appears to be moving towards a significant change 
in perspective. There appears to be more open communica-
tion between the two groups. Whether this more open com-
munication will lead to a rapprochement between the two 
viewpoints (Wachtel, 1977) or to a dialectical synthesis 
of the two (Kanfer, 1979), is not clear. What is clear is 
that a new paradigm appears to be emerging. 
While this emerging viewpoint has been called a 
cognitive-behavioral perspective, it has not congealed into 
a definite paradigm with clearly delimited parameters 
(Mahoney, 1977). Despite this lack of clarity, one rela-
tionship has been repeatedly stressed. Many authors from 
different perspectives have suggested a complex inter-
dependence between environmental, behavioral, cognitive, 
1 
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and biological variables (see Bandura, 1977; Bowers, 1973; 
Endler & Magnusson, 1975; Marchenbaum, 1977; Perls, 1973; 
Wachtel, 1977). 
The nature of this complex system is such that a 
significant interaction between people's beliefs and their 
behavior (see Bandura & Barab, 1971; Baron, Kaufman, & 
Stauber, 1969; Estes, 1972; Kaufman, Baron, & Kopp, 1966) 
as well as between interpersonal behavior and environmental 
responses (see Bell, 1968, 1971; Kelley & Stahelski, 1970; 
Patterson, 1975; Raush, 1965; Thomas & Martin, 1976) have 
been consistently found. In other words, people's beliefs 
influence their behavior, their behavior influences their 
environment, and their environment influences their beliefs 
and behavior. 
Given these complex interdependent relationships, 
the question of the nature of the change process comes to 
mind. While it seems logical to assume that changes in one 
subsystem of this complex network might facilitate changes 
in other subsystems. It is also equally possible that 
changes in one subsystem may be inhibited by other sub-
systems. Clinical examples of the latter have indicated 
that when many people who have been hospitalized with emo-
tional problems recover, and return to their previous en-
vironment, they often revert to their former patterns 
(Haley, 1963). 
In answer to the question on the nature of the 
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change process, many authors (see Bertalanffy, 1968; Haley, 
1963, 1973, 1976; Horowitz, 1973; Marris, 1974; Palazzoli, 
Boscolo, Cechin, & Prata, 1978; Watzlawich, Weakland, & 
Fisch, 1974) have suggested that lasting change is not 
automatic and that there appears to be systematic forces of 
checks and balances which influence and are an integral 
part of the change process. In other words, change is not 
automatic; there is likely to be some resistance. 
Given, again, this network of interdependent rela-
tionships and the ecological nature of the change process, 
the present study attempts to probe and explore this net-
work as well as the dynamics of change. Specifically, this 
study examines the relationships between three elements 
within the individual's belief system (i.e., Internal-
External Locus of Control; Dogmatism; and Self-Esteem}; 
the relationship between the belief system and behavior 
(i.e., interpersonal skills); and the relationship between 
behavior change and the belief system. 
CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE 
Three Components of Belief 
Rokeach (1968) has stated that a "belief system may 
be defined as having represented within it, in some 
organized psychological but not necessarily logical form, 
each and every one of a person's countless beliefs about 
physical and social reality" (p. 2). Given that by defini-
tion the belief system represents the totality of an indi-
vidual's beliefs, Internal-External Locus of Control (I-E}, 
Dogmatism (Dg) , and Self-Esteem (S-E} may be thought of as 
three aspects or components of a person's belief system. 
While these three aspects of belief are not exhaustive, 
they may be considered as representative samples of the 
state of a person's belief system. 
The first component of belief to be examined is 
locus of control. Rotter (1966) distinguishes between two 
groups of people on the I-E continuum, "externals" who 
perceive reinforcements as dependent on luck or others and 
"internals" who perceive reinforcements as contingent upon 
what they do. He states that 
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the individual is selective in what aspects of his 
behavior are repeated or strengthened and what aspects 
are not depending upon his own perception of the nature 
or causality of the relationship between the reinforce-
ment and the preceding behavior •••• If a person per-
ceives a reinforcement as contingent upon his own be-
havior, then the occurrence of either a positive or 
negative reinforcement will strengthen or weaken 
potential for that behavior to recur in the same or 
similar situation. If he sees the reinforcement as 
being outside his own control or not contingent, that 
is depending upon chance, fate, powerful other, or 
unpredictable circumstances, then the preceding be-
havior is less likely to be strengthened or weakened 
(p. 5) • 
Given this difference in expectancy, Rotter be-
lieves that externals will tend to develop and adapt poorly 
to their environment, while internals will tend to learn 
more adaptive behavior and become more aubonomous. If this 
generalization is valid, it would seem that people are 
handicapped by an external belief. 
Parenthetically, Bandura (1977) also believes that 
expectancies play a critical role in differences in be-
havior. However, he distinguishes between what he calls 
"efficacy expectations" and "outcome expectations." The 
former represents the individual's belief that he or she 
may be able to perform some behavior, while the latter 
represents the individual's belief that a given behavior 
will lead to certain outcomes. Bandura characterizes locus 
of control as primarily concerned with causal beliefs about 
action-outcome contingencies rather than with personal 
efficacy. However, while he believes that causal belief 
and self-efficacy are different phenomena, he also thinks 
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that causal ascriptions of behavior to skill or chance can 
rr.ediate the effects of performance on self-efficacy. In 
:>ther words, while these two beliefs are different, they 
are interrelated. 
Although Bandura has made important theoretical 
refinements, this study will deal with locus of control and 
not with his distinctions. 
Familial Antecedents of 
Locus of Control 
The question arises as to the origins of this dif-
ference in expectancies. These differences can, in part, 
be accounted for in the developmental histories of in-
ternals and externals. The research seems to indicate that 
internals and externals were exposed to significantly dif-
ferent child-rearing practices. 
Chance (1965) matched children's scores on Cran-
dall's Intellectual Achievement Responsibility Question-
naire (an internal-external scale) with their mother's at-
titudes towards child rearing. The author found that in-
ternal control expectancies were related to permissive and 
flexible maternal attitudes and expectations of early in-
dependence. 
Katovsky, Crandall, and Good (1967) also compared 
children's scores on the Crandall scale with some observa-
tions of parental behavior and attitudes. Their findings 
indicated that internal control expectancies were related 
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to parental protectiveness, nurturance, and the tendency to 
be approving and non-rejecting. Conversely, parental be-
haviors such as dominance, rejection, and criticalness were 
negatively associated with beliefs in internal control. 
The researchers further noted that the largest number of 
significant results were obtained from behavioral observa-
tions and not with expressed parental attitudes. 
Davis and Phares (1969) also found that parents of 
internals were judged as being more accepting, less reject-
ing, having greater positive involvement, and exercising 
less hostile control than parents of externals. Also, 
parents of internals were perceived as being more consis-
tent disciplinarians than were the parents of externals. 
One other significant finding of the authors was that there 
were no significant differences between the expressed 
attitudes of parents of internals and externals. The dif-
ference was in their actual parenting behaviors. 
MacDonald (1971), using a large sample of college 
students, found that internality was positively correlated 
with perceived parental nurturance and consistency in main-
taining standards for behavior. 
Finally, Epstein and Komcrita (1971) used a sample 
of Black children and found that external attribution of 
success in a matching task was positively correlated with 
inconsistent parental discipline and hostile control. 
To summarize, the research seems to consistently 
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indicate that internals tend to come from warm, accepting 
homes with predictable standards and consistent discipline 
coupled with nurturance. Externals, on the other hand, 
tend to come from homes characterized as being higher in 
the use of physical punishment, overprotection, affective 
punishment, and generally inconsistent discipline. 
Finally Davis and Phares (1969) found that, while 
the parents of internal and external children may have 
similar attitudes toward child rearing, their actual child 
rearing behaviors differed significantly. One might there-
fore speculate that this difference in parental behavior 
may be reflecting the control orientations of the parent 
themselves. 
Sociological Factors and 
Locus of Control 
In addition to familial antecedents, there are 
definite indications that minority group status, socio-
economic status, and level of education, also play a role 
in the differing expectations of internals and externals. 
In one study, Battle and Rotter (1963) used the 
"Children's Picture Test of Internal-External Control," 
a projective task, the Bealer I-E (Internal-External) 
scale, and a live-matching task with eighty black and white 
children from middle and lower class families. The authors 
found that lower-class blacks were more external than mid-
dle class black or whites and that middle class children 
9 
were, in general, more internal than lower class children. 
In another study, Lefcourt and Ladwig (1965a) in-
vestigated differences between blacks and whites in their 
control expectancies. The subjects were compared on three 
different I-E sclaes and a pertinent performance task. 
Blacks were found to be significantly more external than 
whites. The authors suggested that because of societal 
factors (for instance, discrimination) a large portion of 
the externality of blacks could be attributed to blacks' 
dubiousness about avenues open to them rather than doubts 
about their own adequacy. 
Several other researchers have also found that mid-
dle class children are more internal than lower class chil-
dren (Gruen and Ottinger, 1969); that educational level is 
directly related to internality (Walls and Miller, 1970); 
and that socioeconomic status and objective access to 
societal opportunities is positively related to internality 
(Jessor, Graves, Hanson, and Jessor, 1968). 
To summarize, the research indicates that social 
factors also play a significant role in control expecta-
tions, with membership in socially disadvantaged groups 
correlating positively with externality. 
Miscellaneous Differences 
J.n I-E 
Numerous studies have indicated significant dif-
ferences between people maintaining internal vs. external 
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beliefs in control. These have included: achievement be-
havior (Coleman et al., 1966; McGhee & Crandall, 1968; 
Harrison, 1968; Nowicki & Roundtree, 1971), attitude change 
(Ritchie & Phares, 1969; Ryckman, Rodda & Sherman, 1972; 
McGinnies & Ward, 1974; Sherman, 1973; Snyder & Larson, 
1972), birth control practices (Bauman & Udry, 1972; Lundy, 
1972; MacDonald, 1970), cognitive awareness (Lefcourt & 
Wine, 1969; Lefcourt, 1967; Lefcourt, Lewis & Silverman, 
1968; DuCette & Wolk, 1973; Wolk & DuCette, 1974), informa-
tion seeking (Seeman, 1963; Seeman & Evans, 1962; Davis & 
Phares, 1967; Phares, 1968; Williams & Stark, 1972), per-
ceptual sensitivity (Getter, 1966; Rothschild & Horowitz, 
1970; Ude & Vogler, 1969), resistance to subtle influence 
(Gore, 1962; Biondo & MacDonald, 1971), and social con-
formity (Crowne & Liverant, 1963; Tolor, 1971). 
Pines and Julian (1972) have interpreted some of 
these differences as reflecting different strategies used 
by internals and externals to reach important goals. They 
suggest that an internal strategy may be characterized as 
being responsive to the informational demands of a task 
while an external strategy may be characterized as being 
oriented towards the social demands of the situation. 
Overall, these differences indicate that people 
with an internal orientation tend to exhibit better learn-
ing and acquisition of material, actively seek information, 
are more alert and attentive and evidence greater attempts 
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at self-mastery than people with a more external orienta-
tion. On the other hand externals tend to be more easily 
influenced by others and conform more to societal pressures 
than internals. 
Locus of Control and 
Maladjustment 
Several studies have dealt with control orientation 
as a measure of emotional adjustment. Distefano, Pryer, 
and Smith (1971) administered the I-E scale to normal 
adolescents, psychiatric patients, and normal adults. They 
found that there was a significant linear relationship of 
increasing internality as a function of increasing age in 
the adolescent group. In addition to this, they noted that 
the psychiatric group scores were more extreme in either 
direction than those of the adult group. The authors sug-
gest that perception of control is relevant to both normal 
development and emotional adjustment. 
The research of Smith, Pryer, and Distefano (1971) 
also indicates the relationship between emotional adjust-
ment and locus of control. They compared the I-E scores 
with behavioral ratings of thirty mildly and thirty 
severely emotionally disturbed hospitalized psychiatric 
patients. The authors found that the severely emotionally 
impaired patients were significantly more external than the 
mildly disturbed patients. 
A similar study by Lottman and DeWolfe (1972) found 
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that process schizophrenics (a poor premorbid adjustment) 
were significantly more external than reactive schizo-
phrenics (good premorbid adjustment) • The authors suggest 
that these differences in expectancies to be a function of 
long-term learning and not simply current symptoms. 
In addition to these, numerous other studies have 
consistently found a positive relationship between ex-
ternality and maladjustment and anxiety (see Joe, 1971; 
Lefcourt, 1976; Phares, 1976). However, while severity of 
psychopathology appears to be related to externality as 
suggested by Shybut (1968), other studies have indicated 
that not all diagnostic groups are externally oriented. 
Harrow and Ferrante (1969) administered the Rotter 
scale to a group of psychiatric patients during the first 
week of their hospitalization and again after six weeks. 
The authors found that the schizophrenic group was sig-
nificantly more external than the other groups. At the 
other extreme, the manic group was extremely internal, with 
depressives and character disorders scoring between the two 
extremes. When subjects were retested, there was a non-
significant shift towards internality in the schizophrenic 
group. There was, however, a significant shift towards in-
ternality in the non-schizophrenic groups as well as a 
shift towards a more normal locus of control (i.e., less 
extreme internality) with the manic group. 
In regards to depression, severalcorrelational 
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studies have found a significant relationship between ex-
ternality and self-report measures of depression (see 
Calhoun, Cheney, & Davis, 1974; Naditch, Gargen, & Michael, 
1975; Warehime & Foulds, 1971). In addition to this, and 
in support of Seligman's (1975) position on "learned help-
lessness," Hiroto (1974) found that external beliefs, 
chance conditions and inescapable pretreatment learning 
all retard the development of escape behavior. 
However, while it appears that externality and de-
pression are related, Phares (1978) cautions that it is im-
possible to "assert with confidence that depression relates 
to an external orientation and is unrelated to internal 
beliefs" (p. 286). He suggests that a variety of factors 
may be confounding this relationship, including the poten-
tially pessimistic wording of external items (Lamont, 1972), 
the possible relationship between internality and social 
desirability, as well as possible differences between as-
suming responsibility for failures and successes. Further-
more, he suggests that defensive externals (who act like 
internals while espousing external beliefs) may seriously 
distort the relationship between depression and externality. 
Similarly, the relationship between I-E and 
alcoholism and drug abuse is far from clear-cut. While 
Norwicki and Hopper (1974) and Palmer (1971) reported that 
alcoholics or heavy drinkers were found to be externally 
oriented. Goss and Morosko (1970) found that a sample of 
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262 alcoholic outpatients were significantly more internal 
than Rotter's (1966) general norms. Similar results were 
reported in the above-mentioned study by Distefano et al 
(1971) as well as by Gozali and Sloan (1971). 
In a comparative study between narcotics users and 
college students, Bergins and Ross (1973) found that the 
drug users had significantly more internal I-E scores than 
the college sample. However, these differences may have 
been due to a lack of adequate matching between groups (see 
Phares, 1976). In fact, Strassberg and Robinson (1974) 
found that among a group of drug users those who had a more 
external orientation were also considered more maladjustea. 
Phares (1976) has suggested that the apparent con-
tradiction in results between alcoholic groups may be due 
to chronic alcoholics having a history of participation in 
treatment programs that reinforce the espousal of internal 
attitudes. However, Berzins and Ross (1973) have suggested 
that "internal control can additionally be conceptualized 
as a consequence or by-product of substance abuse. Perhaps 
a term such as 'pseudo-internality' should be used to dis-
tinguish drug-engendered internality from its conventional, 
socially learned counterpart" (p. 90). 
Related to this, Lefcourt (1976) has stated that 
"alcoholics and drug addicts often are known to deny the 
fact that they have become dependent upon a drug. It is, 
consequently, not accidental that an important element in 
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recovery for both alcoholics and drug addicts is the open 
admission of addiction. Perhaps the more internal re-
sponses of these addicts reflect a tendency to deny the 
very helplessness or slavishness to the drug in question 
that is so evident to everyone but the addict himself" 
(p. 92). 
While these differences do not refute Shybut's 
argument that severity of psychopathology is related to 
externality, they may indicate that different diagnostic 
groups would require different treatment approaches, de-
pending on their control orientation (some tentative sup-
port for this comes from Abramowitz, Abramowitz, Roback & 
Jackson, 1974; Friedman & Dies, 1974; Helweg, 1974; Jacob-
son, 1974; Kilman, Albert, & Sotile, 1975). Furthermore, 
while the data on I-E and adjustment tends to support 
Rotter's hypothesis that people are handicapped by an ex-
ternal orientation, because a great deal of the data is 
correlational, it is difficult to tell whether externality 
leads to maladjustment or vice-versa. Finally, it seems 
likely that those diagnostic groups that might be called 
"pseudo-internal," may also be handicapped by their own 
denial of their difficulties. 
In other words, while it seems highly probable that 
people are likely to be handicapped by an external belief 
system, it also seems likely that in some situations an 
internal orientation may be a handicap. 
Dogmatism: Open Mind, Close 
Mind 
16 
The second component of belief systems to be dis-
cussed is dogmatism. In his seminal work on dogmatism, 
Rokeach (1960) articulated his theoretical position on the 
nature of cognitive structure. He suggested that all of a 
person's beliefs may be organized into two interdependent 
parts--a belief system and a disbelief system. The belief 
system consisting of "all the beliefs, sets, expectancies, 
or hypotheses, conscious and unconscious, that a person at 
a given time accepts as true of the world" (p. 33) • While 
the disbelief system consists of "a series of subsystems 
rather than merely a single one, and contains all the dis-
beliefs, sets, expectancies, conscious and unconscious, 
that, to one degree or another, a person at a given time 
rejects as false" (p. 33) • 
Rokeach suggests that the belief-disbelief dimen-
sion has several additional properties. These include: 
isolation, the degree of communication among beliefs; dif-
ferentiation, the extent of articulation or richness of 
detail; and comprehensiveness, the range or total number of 
disbelief systems. 
In addition to this, he suggests that there are 
levels of belief within the system. These levels include: 
the most central region which deals with the person's 
"primitive beliefs" about the nature of the physical world, 
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social reality, and the nature of the self; the inter-
mediate region which deals with the person's beliefs re-
garding positive and negative authority in his or her life; 
and, the peripheral region which contain the individual's 
"derived" beliefs which emanate from acceptance of various 
authorities (see Rokeach, 1968, for a slight revision of 
this structural organization) . 
The nature of this central-peripheral dimension is 
such that central beliefs are most resistant to change and 
peripheral beliefs are easiest.to change. Furthermore, a 
change in a central belief will result in greater systemic 
change within the belief system than a change in any other 
level of belief. 
From these basic dimensions, Rokeach proposed dif-
ferential relationships among dimensions to distinguish 
between the open and closed mind. He characterized a sys-
tem as closed (the person characterized as dogmatic) to the 
extent that "there is a high degree of rejection of all 
disbelief subsystems, an isolation of beliefs, a high dis-
crepancy in degree of differentiation between belief and 
disbelief systems, and little differentiation within the 
disbelief system" (p. 61). 
Futhermore, he assumes that "the more closed the 
system, the more will the world be seen as threatening, the 
greater will be the belief in absolute authority, the more 
will other persons be evaluated according to the authorities 
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they line up with, and the more will peripheral beliefs be 
rela1:ed to each other by virtue of their common origin in 
authority, rather than by virtue of intrinsic connections" 
(p. 62). 
Conversely, a system may be characterized as being 
open, "where rejection of disbeliefs is low; where there 
is a communication among beliefs and between beliefs and 
disbeliefs; where there is little discrepancy in the degree 
of differentiation between belief and disbelief systems; 
and where there is a relatively high degree of differenti-
ation within the disbelief system" (Erlich, 1978, p. 136). 
Additionally, "the world is seen to be a more 
friendly place by the relatively open person. He should 
thus be more free and more impervious to irrelevant pres-
sures. For him, the power of authority is still there, but 
depends upon the authority's cognitive correctness, ac-
curacy, and consistency with other information he has about 
the world" (Rokeach, 1960, p. 63). 
Finally, and similarly to Marris (1974), Rokeach 
believes that the cognitive structure serves two powerful 
and conflicting motives--the need to know or understand and 
the need to protect or ward off threats. He states that 
to the extent that the cognitive need to know is pre-
dominant and the need to ward off threat absent, open 
systems should result. In the service of the cognitive 
need to know, external pressures and irrational inter-
nal drives will often be pushed aside, so that informa-
tion received from outside will be discriminated, as-
sesed, and acted on according to the objective require-
19 
ments of the situation. But as the need to ward off 
threat becomes stronger, the cognitive need to know 
should become weak<ar, resulting in more closed belief 
systems. Under threat, information and source should 
become inseparable and should be evaluated arbitrarily 
in line with the rewards and punishments meted out by 
authority (p. 68. 
It can be seen that Rokeach's conceptualization has 
some definite parallels with Rotter's I-E distinctions. 
However, internality and open-mindedness as well as ex-
ternality and closed-mindedness are not identical. Despite 
this, it does seem likely that a person is likely to be 
handicapped with a dogmatic or closed belief system. 
Antecedents of the Open and 
Closed Mind 
As with the I-E literature, several studies indi-
cate significant differences in the backgrounds of people 
with open vs. closed belief systems. Rokeach and Kemp 
(1960) found very significant correlations between dogma-
tism and anxiety among various samples from the United 
States and England. In addition to this, the authors found 
that the more dogmatic subjects reported a significantly 
higher incidence of childhood anxiety indicators (i.e., 
thumb-sucking, nail-biting, nightmares, etc) than the more 
open-minded subjects. 
In a replication of this study, Hanson and Clune 
(1973) with a sample of seventh and eighth grade students 
also found a significant difference in the number of 
anxiety indicators reported by high vs. low dogmatic 
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subjects. While these two studies support the hypothesis 
that dogmatism may be a defense against anxiety, the ques-
tion remains as to what contributed to these early experi-
ences of anxiety. 
Not surprisingly, Lesser and Steininger (1975) 
found low, positive and significant correlations between 
college students Dg scores and the Dg scores of their 
parents. These correlations ranged from .20 to .40 with 
the highest correlations being between husbands and wives. 
The authors suggest that while the data supports the 
hypothesis that dogmatism develops within the family, 
family experiences are one source of influence, but not the 
only source. 
Other authors have also found a significant rela-
tionship between parental attitudes (Rebhun, 1967), child 
rearing practices (Anderson, 1967), and parental level of 
dogmatism (Bolmeier, 1966), with the level of their chil-
dren's dogmatism. Ehrlich (1973) suggests that parents can 
create a warm, loving, supportive environment or a reject-
ing, neglectful, and cold, or even worse, an inconsistent 
environment. He concludes that both rejection and incon-
sistency seem directly related to such concomitants of 
dogmatism as anxiety, negative self-attitudes, and the re-
jection of others. 
While the data indicates that the familial environ-
ment is one source of influence on dogmatism levels, as 
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Lesser and Steininger cautioned, it is not the only in~ 
fluence. Sticht and Fox's (1966) work indicates that 
stability of the social network is another factor in-
fluencing level of dogmatism. They found that college 
students who had relatively stable social networks (changed 
permanent residences three or less times during their life 
time) were significantly more open-minded than college stu-
dents with less stable social networks (seven to twenty 
changes in permanent residences). Additionally, it was 
found that the more mobile group was significantly more 
anxious than their more stationary counterparts. 
Related to the stability of the social network, 
Frumkin (1961) found an inverse relationship between Dg 
scores and social class as measured by the Hollingshead-
Redlich Index. In addition to this, Alter and White (1966) 
found regional differences in Dg scores. What this data 
suggests is that in addition to familial factors, social 
factors such as social class, regional norms, and the 
stability of the social network all play a role in the 
development of cognitive structure. 
Overall, the data on antecedents of cognitive 
structure closely parallel the literature on the ante-
cedents of I-E, with people having external orientations 
and closed belief systems, as well as, those with internal 
orientations and open belief systems coming from apparently 
similar backgrounds. 
Dogmatism: Learning and 
Resistance 
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Another area in which differences in cognitive 
structure has been noted to have an effect is in the area 
of change and the resistance to change. While Rokeach 
(1960) suggested that dogmatic persons are highly resistant 
to change, Ehrlich and Lee's (1969) review of the litera-
ture indicates that this is not always the case. 
In one of the first studies to test the influence 
of cognitive structure on learning, Ehrlich (196la) found 
with a sample of students enrolled in an introductory 
sociology course, a significant negative correlation be-
tween dogmatism scores and test performance. Ehrlich con-
eluded that "subjects low in dogmatism entered the sociology 
classroom with a higher level of learning, learned more as 
a result of classroom exposure, and retained this informa-
tion to a significantly greater degree than more dogmatic 
subjects" (p. 149). 
While these results were duplicated in a follow-up 
study, five years later (Ehrlich, 196lb), Costin (1965), in 
a replication of Ehrlich's design, failed to find a signifi-
cant correlation between dogmatism and classroom perfor-
mance with a group of psychology students. Costin suggested 
that these results might indicate that there was more than 
one kind of closed-mindedness and/or that the content of 
learning was the significant intervening variable. 
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Other studies have contributed to these contradic-
tory results. While Franklin (1961) and Zagona and Zurcher 
(1965) both found that more open-minded subjects had hi~her 
grades than their more closed-minded counterparts, Christen-
sen (1963) reported no significant correlations between 
dogmatism and two postcourse measures of academic per-
formance. Furthermore, Baker (1964) found that, in a con-
cept-learning task, closed-minded subjects performed sig-
nificantly better than the more open-minded subjects of the 
study. 
From 1963 to 1965, Dg scores were gathered on 2,099 
students in 14 introductory psychology classes of seven 
different instructors (White & Alter, 1967). Six of the 14 
correlations between dogmatism and examination grades were 
significant at the .05 level with an average correlation of 
-.18. 
In a second and far more complex correlational 
study, Rokeach and Norrell (1966) examined the relationship 
between dogmatism and classroom performance for 798 sub-
jects in 33 courses with six groups of curricular majors, 
four of which were subdivided into male and female majors. 
The authors found that 17 of the 33 courses provided at 
least one significant correlation between course grade and 
Dg scores with or without control for sex and major. The 
total analysis performed by sex and major for each course 
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yielded 20 low but significant negative correlations be-
tween grades and level of dogmatism. 
Ehrlich and Lee {1969) after reviewing these 
studies stated that, "the number of positive results are 
beyond chance, and the on-again-off-again character of the 
findings strongly indicates the presence of uncontrolled, 
intervening variables" {p. 251). They suggest that the 
presence or absence of five intervening variables may ac-
count for some of these shifting results. 
First, numerous studies {see Jacoby, 1967; Mikol, 
1960; Pyron, 1966a; Pyron, 1966b; Pyron & Lambert, 1967; 
Rokeach, Oram, Laffey, & Denny, 1960; Rokeach, Swanson, & 
Denny, 1960; Rokeach & Vidulich, 1960; Vacchiano, Shiffman, 
& Strauss, 1967; Zagona & Kelly, 1966; Zagona & Zurcher, 
1965) have indicated that open and closed groups respond 
differently in novel situations. Specifically, dogmatic 
groups tend to reject the novel, the unconventional, and 
the new while taking a rather conservative stance by going 
along with tradition. More open groups, on the other hand, 
are more accepting of the new and adapt better to novel 
situations. 
A second intervening variable which has been found 
to differentiate between high and low dogmatic groups is 
the authority source of the new belief {see DiRenzo, 1967; 
Kemp, 1962; McCarty & Johnson, 1962; Norris, 1965; Powell, 
1962; Vidulich & Kaiman, 1961). This research indicates 
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that dogmatic subjects are more influenced by the status of 
an authority and will change in accordance with the demands 
of an authority. While less dogmatic subjects' learning 
tends to be more directed by the requirements of the situa-
tion rather than authority demands. 
Thirdly, belief congruence, the principle that the 
more similar a belief is with one's own belief the greater 
the degree of acceptance has also differentiated between 
open and closed groups. Several studies (see Adams & 
Vidulich, 1962; Costin, 1968; Kleck & Wheaton, 1967; Miller, 
1965; Pyron & Kafer, 1967) have indicated that closed groups 
do not learn belief-incongruent materials as well as open 
groups. In addition to this, under conditions of high cen-
trality, the fourth mediating factor, beliefs are not only 
more resistant to change (Rokeach, Reyher, & Wiseman, 1968) 
but also closed groups are likely to change their problem-
solving behavior (White, Alter, & Rardin, 1965). 
The final intervening variable suggested by Ehrlich 
and Lee, Syndrome relevance, refers to the interaction be-
tween the method of presentation of information and the in-
dividual's cognitive structure. The data indicate that 
open groups are likely to be more responsive to an open-
ended presentation of information, while closed groups are 
apparently more responsive to a more dogmatic approach 
(McGuckin, 1967; Rokeach, Oram, Laffey, & Denny, 1960; 
Zagona & Zurcher, 1964). 
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In line with the role of these intervening vari-
ables, Erhlich (1971) reanalyzed Rokeach and Norrell's 
(1966) data, arguing that control for the centrality of the 
materials being learned had not been taken. Positing that 
college major was an indicator of centrality, Ehrlich 
found that in nonmajor areas, significant negative cor-
relations between dogmatism and grades occurred 10 percent 
of the time. While in major area classes, there were sig-
nificant negative correlations 35 percent of the time. 
It therefore seems generally correct to conclude 
that, "closed-minded persons are less able than open-minded 
persons to learn new beliefs and to change old beliefs. 
Nevertheless, the principle remains to be qualified by a 
consideration of five intervening variables: the authority-
source of the new beliefs, the syndrome relevance of their 
mode of communication, the belief congruence and novelty of 
the new beliefs, and their centrality to the individual" 
(Ehrlich & Lee, 1969, p. 258). 
Dogmatism and Adjustment 
Unlike the I-E literature which indicates that in 
some situations both an internal and external orientation 
may be maladaptive, the data on dogmatism indicates fairly 
consistently that a closed belief system is a sign of poor 
adjustment. 
In two early factor-analytic studies Rokeach 
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(Rokeach & Fruchter, 1956; Fruchter, Rokeach, & Novak, 
1958) found that dogmatism and anxiety emerged together as 
part of a single factor. Additionally, this factor was 
also loaded on self-rejection and paranoid tendencies. 
This relationship between anxiety and dogmatism has been 
found fairly often in most of the pertinent literature 
(Norman, 1966; Rebhun, 1966; Sticht & Fox, 1966). Given 
the consistency of this finding, it seems safe to conclude 
that dogmatism may be considered as a defense against 
anxiety (Rokeach, 1960) . 
In addition to this relationship, other studies 
have contributed elements to the profile differences be-
tween open and closed groups. Plant, Telford, and Thomas 
(1965) found significant differences between open and 
closed groups of college freshmen on 5 scales of the 
California Psychological Inventory (CPI). Based on these 
differences the authors concluded that "the nondogmatic 
subjects would be described as being outgoing and enter-
prising, clam and patient, mature and forceful, efficient 
and clear thinking, planful and responsible, and more 
likely to succeed in an academic setting than would the 
highly dogmatic subjects . . . the dogmatic college fresh-
men would be described as being impulsive, defensive, and 
conventional and stereotyped in thinking" (pp. 73-74) . 
Similarly, Vacchiano, Strauss, and Schiffman (1968) 
discussed a "relatively consistent dogmatic personality 
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pattern 11 which emerged from correlations between the Dg 
scale and various personality measures. They concluded 
that the dogmatic subject 
••• ha[s] a need to receive support, encouragement, 
and understanding from others; an intolerance for 
understanding the feelings and motives of others; and 
an avoidance in changing • • • environment or daily 
routine .••. lacks self-esteem, is doubtful about 
.•. self-worth, is anxious, lacks confidence in him-
self, lacks either self-acceptance or self-satisfac-
tion, is non-committal and defensive, and is dissatis-
fied with his behavior, his physical state, his own 
personal worth, and his adequacy. Personality malad-
justment and instability appear to underlie dogmatism 
(p. 84). 
Research with different populations has also shown 
high levels of dogmatism to be a handicap. Ehrlich and 
Bauer (1966) found that among psychiatric patients length 
of hospital stay was related to level of dogmatism. 
Specifically, while 51 percent of low dogmatic patients 
were discharged in less than three weeks, only 27 percent 
of high dogmatic patients were discharged in this time. 
Furthermore, twice as many closed-minded patients remain 
hospitalized for over seven weeks as open-minded patients. 
The authors stated that "the high-dogmatic patient is more 
likely than the low-dogmatic patient to be diagnosed as 
functionally psychotic, as having a definite thinking dis-
order, and as having greater social and occupational im-
pairment. Prognosis is poorer for the high-scoring 
patients, and they are more frequently given drug therapy 
and more drugs. Finally, they are retained in the 
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hospital longer than low-scoring patients" {p. 258). 
Of related interest, Butts and Chotlos {1974) found 
that both a group of hospitalized patients in two different 
alcoholism treatment programs as well as a group diagnosed 
as schizophrenic were significantly more dogmatic than a 
normal control group. 
In a different context, Hallenbech and Lundstedt 
{1966) found a significant difference in adjustment to 
gradual blindness between open and closed groups. Sig-
nificant correlations were found between dogmatism, denial, 
and depression. The authors suggested that the closed-
minded person is less willing to accept major changes of 
the self than the more open-minded person. 
While many of these studies indicate a positive 
correlation between dogmatism and negative self-attitudes, 
several other studies have indicated that positive self-
attitudes may be independent of dogmatism level {see 
Hamilton, 1971; Ohnmacht & Muro, 1967; Pannes, 1963). In 
fact, Lee and Ehrlich {1971) in a correlational study, with 
a shortened version of the Dg scale without self-belief 
items, found significant correlations which confirmed 
theoretical expectations. However, the authors speculated, 
that because these correlations were not sizeable, that 
there might be two types of dogmatism, one characterized by 
negative self-attitudes, the other by positive ones. 
Overall, the bulk of the data on the open and closed 
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mind indicates that in most contexts, dogmatism is related 
to poor adjustment and that people are apparently handi-
capped by a closed belief system. 
Self-Esteem: Orientation 
Towards the Self-as-Object 
The third component of belief systems, self-esteem, 
is an integral part of the self-concept. Rosenberg (1979) 
defines the self-concept as "the totality of the indi-
vidual's thoughts and feelings having reference to himself 
as an object" (p. 7). Given this definition, the self-
concept may be considered as a subsystem of the total be-
lief system. 
In delineating this component of belief systems, 
Rosenberg distinguished three broad regions under the 
rubric "self-concept": the Extant Self (how people see 
themselves); the Desired Self (how they would like to see 
themselves); and the Presenting Self (how they show them-
selves to others). In addition to these three major as-
pects of the "self-concept," Rosenberg suggests that it has 
two primary motives: Self-Esteem (a positive or negative 
orientation toward the self-as-object) and Self-Consistency 
(a desire to act in accordance with the self-concept). 
Finally, he states that there are four principles 
that govern self-concept formation: Reflected Appraisals 
(people are influenced by the attitudes of others towards 
the self and come to view themselves as they are viewed by 
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others); Social Comparisons (people learn about themselves 
through comparisons with others which leads to posi·;:ive, 
neutral, or negative self-ratings); Self-Attribution (people 
draw conclusions about themselves based in part by observing 
their behavior and its outcomes); and Psychological Cen-
trality (people differ in the relative value that they at-
tribute to different aspects of the self-concept with more 
central aspects being more resistant to change) . This last 
principle closely resembles Rokeach's discussion of the 
central peripheral dimension. 
Given the complexity of the self-concept, this 
study will only focus on the role of self-esteem but from 
within the framework provided by Rosenberg. He states that 
"self-esteem signifies a positive or negative orientation 
toward an object. When we characterize a person as having 
high self-esteem, we are not referring to feelings of 
superiority, in the sense of arrogance, conceit, contempt 
for others, overweening pride; we mean rather, that he has 
self-respect, considers himself a person of worth ••.. 
The term 'low self-esteem' ••• means that the individual 
lacks respect for himself, considers himself unworthy, in-
adequate, or otherwise seriously deficient as a person" 
(p. 54). 
Antecedents of S-E 
Despite the importance of the principle of 
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reflected appraisals and the role of significant others in 
the development of the self-concept, Rosenberg (1979) 
argues that "not all significant others are equally sig-
nificant and those who are more significant have greater 
influence on ••• self-concepts" (p. 83). Specifically, 
he found a significant relationship between the individual's 
S-E and the opinion of valued as well as respected others--
that is, those people who the individual stated were im-
portant to him or her as well as those whose opinions were 
thought to be correct. Not surprisingly, in rank-order of 
importance, those significant others were found to be the 
child's mother, followed by the father, sisters and 
brothers, teachers, friends, and finally classmates. 
However, Rosenberg points out that "the child who 
has come to the conclusion that one of his significant 
others . • . thinks poorly of him is much more likely to 
decide that he 'doesn't care' what they think; and if, in-
deed, he is successful in internalizing this valuation, 
then he can very effectively protect his self-esteem" 
(pp. 87-89). In other words, while the opinions of others 
have an impact, the individual is not a passive recipient 
of that information and he or she may actively select that 
information which either enhances or protects S-E. 
Rosenberg (1979) concludes that "the more the other person 
criticizes or disapproves of him, the more will the indi-
vidual try to shrug it off, discount their judgment, with-
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draw affect from them. Although he will not be entirely 
successful, the inclination is there. In the long run, 
then, he is likely to end up caring most about the opinions 
of those who, in his view, think well of him" (p. 90). 
Given that significant others can have a significant 
effect on the individual's S-E, Coopersmith's (1967) study 
on the antecedents of S-E indicates the important role of 
child-rearing practices in the development of S-E. He 
found that the mothers of children with high S-E tended to 
have high S-E themselves, while, the mothers of children 
with low S-E were not only themselves low in S-E but were 
also apt to be considered emotionally unstable. He found 
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that the fathers of high S-E children took a more active 
and supportive role in rearing their children than the 
fathers of low S-E children. 
His data further indicated that the most notable 
antecedents of high S-E were directly related to parental 
behavior and the consequences of the rules and regulation 
that parents establish for their children. Specifically, 
he found that high S-E in children was related to definite 
and consistently enforced limits on behavior as well as 
less drastic forms of punishment, attitudes of total or 
near total acceptance of children and considerable flexi-
bility for individual behavior within established limits. 
When Rosenberg's and Coopersmith's conclusions on 
S-E development are combined, it can be seen how the 
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selectivity of the individual child within a supportive 
context provided by a high S-E family can lead to a high 
level of S-E. Furthermore, the high S-E familial environ-
ment closely parallels the more internal I-E familial 
environment. 
Another factor that is related to S-E is social 
class. Rosenberg's data indicates that social class has no 
significant impact on the level of S-E of children, has 
some modest association for adolescents, and a very sig-
nificant effect on the S-E level of adults. Specifically, 
Rosenberg found that S-E was positively related to educa-
tion, occupation, and income. Luck and Heiss (1972) in 
a study with adult males also found that S-E was positively 
related to occupational achievement, income, and prestige 
level of occupation. 
Rosenberg's data indicates that to a large entent 
the child's interpersonal environment is socioeconomically 
homogeneous, while the adult's interpersonal environment is 
relatively more heterogeneous. Given this difference, 
social comparisons based on social class will have little 
impact on the S-E of children, but for adults, a significant 
portion of their social comparisons is related to their 
social class which does have an impact on their S-E. 
In regards to the principle of reflected appraisals, 
the social status of a child within the context of his or 
her significant others in not important. Howeverr with 
35 
adults, people do interact according to the individual's 
social status and it therefore has an influence on adult 
S-E. Additionally, to some extent social class is some-
thing achieved by the adult while it is something ascribed 
to the child. Therefore, due to the role of self-attribu-
tion, social status which is earned by adults will in-
fluence their level of S-E, while the social status which 
is conferred on the child will not. Parenthetically, 
academic success which is earned by the child and S-E are 
related for the child (see Purkey, 1970). 
Finally, Rosenberg suggests that social class has 
greater impact on adult S-E than on children's S-E because 
social status is psychologically more central for adults 
than children. He concludes that "the general principles 
governing self-esteem formation among children and adults 
are .•• identical. But one cannot understand the sig-
nificance of a social structural variable for the individual 
without learning how this variable enters his experience 
and is processed within his own phenomenal field. . . • The 
differential association of social class to self-esteem for 
children and adults sterns from the different social experi-
ences and psychological interpretations associated with this 
structural fact in these age groups" (pp. 146-47). 
Another area that is related to S-E is minority 
group status. While one might assume tiic:Etrntnori ty group 
status might be associated with lower levels of S-E, the 
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data does not support that assumption. In regards to Black 
youth, the data consistently indicates equal to higher 
levels of S-E to that of comparable White samples. 
McDonald and Gynther (1965) found that a group of black 
high school seniors had a significantly higher level of S-E 
than their white peers. While Coleman and his associates 
(1966) in a national study indicated no difference in the 
"academic self-concept" of blacks and whites, McDill, 
Meyers, and Rigsby (1966) found that when blacks and whites 
were matched on a number of variables, blacks showed higher 
academic self-concepts. Furthermore, several large sample 
studies (Bachman, 1970; Hunt & Hardt, 1969) have found that 
when class, I.Q., and family structure are controlled, 
blacks have higher levels of S-E than whites. 
Comparable results have been reported with adult 
samples. In one study (Middleton, 1972), while black S-E 
was found to be lower than white S-E, when socioeconomic 
factors were controlled, blacks had significantly higher 
S-E than whites. Kohn (1969), in a nationwide study, found 
blacks to be non-significantly more self-deprecatory but 
significantly more self-confident than whites. 
The data is not as clear with Latin-Americans as it 
is with blacks. While numerous studies (Coleman, et al., 
1966; Hishiki, 1969; Peterson & Ramirez, 1971; Zirkel & 
Moses, 1971) indicate that Spanish-Americans have lower S-E 
than Anglo-Americans, other studies (Carter, 1968; Healey & 
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DeBlassie, 1974) have indicated that the S-E of Latinos is 
equal to or higher than the S-E of Anglos. Given these 
equivocal results, it is difficult to conclude what effects 
does minority group status have on the S-E of Spanish-
Americans. 
One minority group, in which the data is far less 
equivocal, are Jews. Of the small number of studies that 
have dealt with the level of S-E of Jewish subjects, most 
have indicated that Jews had somewhat higher S-E than non-
Jewish whites (see Anisfield, Bogo, & Lambert, 1962; 
Bachman, 1970) . 
Rosenberg (1979) suggests that several factors may 
account for minority groups having satisfactory S-E levels. 
Specifically, he points out that "the conversion of 
society's attitude toward one's group ••• into the in-
dividual's attitude toward the self is logically compelling 
only if certain assumptions are sound •••• First ••• 
the individual knows how the broader society feels about 
his group .•.. Second .•• he accepts the societal view 
of his group. • . • Third . . • he believes the societal 
view of the group's characteristics apply to the self .• 
Fourth ••• he is critically concerned with the majority 
attitudes" (p. 157). In additlon to these, he suggests 
that minority group members would have to make direct com-
parisons between themselves and the majority. 
Rosenberg's data indicates that the first four 
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assumptions are generally not met and that, at least among 
children, the majority of minority group members dono~com­
pare themselves with whites but with members of their own 
group. However, while membership in a minority group, per 
se, does not appear to be related to lower levels of S-E, 
the direct experience of being different from those around 
one does. 
Rosenberg has discussed the negative impact of con-
textual dissonance on S-E. He states that contextual dis-
sonance occurs when "people who have been socialized in one 
culture or subculture find themselves in environments in 
which other groups norms prevail. In these groups, both 
the qualities of others and of the self are implicated in 
defining the individual as different" (1979, p. 113). 
Examples of this would include blacks in a white environ-
ment, Catholics in a Protestant environment, the poor in a 
rich environment, etc. The experience of contextual dis-
sonance is likely to be very different for the individual 
than contextual consonance (e.g., Latinos in a Latin en-
vironment, Jews in a Jewish environment, etc.). 
Rosenberg's (1979) data indicates that dissonant 
contexts have negative effects on people's S-E. Namely, 
he found that individuals who were in a dissonant context 
due to differences in religious, racial, and/or socio-
economic backgrounds consistently had lower S-E than mem-
bers of their own groups who were in consonant contexts. 
39 
Several other studies (see Bachman, 1970; Crain & Weissman, 
1972; St. John, 1975) support Rosenberg's position on the 
effects of contextual dissonance on S-E. 
Several possible reasons for these results have 
been suggested 
First • • • the consonant context is a congenial com-
munications environment. Within it, the individual is 
protected from the prejudice of the outside world .• 
Second, the consonant context represents a familiar, 
comfortable environment, for it is the culture into 
which the individual has been socialized • • • the 
individual in the consonant environment is likely to 
have a feeling of belongingness, the one in the dis-
sonant context to feel strange, ·•out of it,' somehow 
•·wrong.' ••• Third, the dissonant context may repre-
sent an infelicitous comparison reference group ••• 
[it] may also represent an environment of inconsistent 
reflected appraisals .••• In such an environment 
there may well be a disconcerting mismatch between the 
individual's taken-for-grantedself-concept, represent-
ing his fundamental framework for dealing with his 
world, and the messages about himself returned to him 
by others (Rosenberg, 1979, p. 125). 
To briefly summarize the data on the antecedents of 
global S-E, first, significant others and child-rearing 
practices play an important role in the development of S-E, 
but it is important to note that the individual, within 
limits, actively selects those significant others who en-
hance his or her S-E. Second, while the four principles of 
self-concept formation (reflected appraisals, social com-
parisons, self-attribution and psychological centrality) 
are important both to the child's and the adult's level of 
S-E, only socioeconomic factors appear related to adult S-E. 
Third, contrary to the common wisdom, minority group status, 
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per se, does not appear to be directly related to lower 
levels of S-E. However, to 1~e extent that prejudice and 
discriminatory practices result in lower socioeconomic 
status adult S-E is likely to be affected. Finally, the 
direct experience of being different due to one's religion, 
race, and/or class in some negative contexts appears to be 
related to lower levels of S-E. 
S-E Differences 
Given the many factors which contribute to the de-
velopment of S-E, the question arises as to what are some 
of the likely consequences of high vs. low S-E. High and 
low S-E groups have been found to consistently differ in 
their reports of anxiety and depression. As might be ex-
pected, low S-E subjects have been found to be significantly 
more depressed (e.g., Beck, 1967; Kaplan & Pokorny, 1969; 
Luck & Heiss, 1972; Rosenberg, 1965} and more anxious (e.g., 
Kaplan and Pokorny, 1969; Luck & Heiss, 1972; Rosenberg, 
1965} than high S-E subjects. Conversely, high S-E subjects 
have been found to be significantly happier (Bachman, 1970} 
and "better adjusted" (Coopersmith, 1967; Rosenberg, 1965} 
than their low S-E counterparts. 
In addition to these differences, Fitts (1972} 
cites evidence from numerous unpublished studies which in-
dicate that low S-E groups drop-out of school significantly 
more than higher S-E groups. While high S-E groups have 
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been found to not only perform better academically but also 
have more positive social relationships as well (see Combs, 
1964; Shaw, Edson, & Bell, 1960; Sha~ & McCuen, 1960; 
Williams & Cole, 1968). 
Overall, this small sample of S-E differences tend 
to indicate that low S-E groups appear to function poorly, 
experience more "failure" and "unhappiness" and less "suc-
cess" than high S-E groups. 
A second question which arises is how exactly does 
S-E contribute to these differences. Another area of dif-
ference between S-E groups, that may provide some answers 
to this question, deal with research on success and failure 
experiences. Numerous studies (Fitch, 1970; Leventhal & 
Perloe, 1962; Silverman, 1964; Stotland & Hillman, 1962; 
Stotland, Thorley, Cohen, & Zander, 1957) have found that 
high S-E subjects tend to be more sensitive to success and 
favorable feedback and less sensitive to failure and nega-
tive feedback than low S-E subjects. While just the ob-
verse has been found with low S-E subjects. Furthermore, 
high S-E groups tend to evaluate their performance more 
favorably even when their objective performance is equiva-
lent to low S-E groups (Shrauger, 1972). In addition to 
these differences, Shrauger and Patterson (1974) found that 
high S-E subjects evaluated others more frequently on 
dimensions on which they themselves compared favorably than 
did low S-E subjects. In other words, these groups appear 
42 
to assimilate data which is not only congruent with their 
self-image but also appears to maintain it. 
Of related interest, Mischel, Ebbeson, and Zeiss 
(1973) point out that after a success experience, people 
tend to engage in behaviors which perpetuate the positive 
affect induced by success. However, given the differential 
responsiveness of high and low S-E groups to succ3ss and 
failure experiences, it can easily be seen how low S-E 
groups are more prone to depression, anxiety, etc. 
Belief Systems Nexus: Simi-
larities and Differences 
Overall the data has indicated definite similarities 
between and among the three assessed components of belief. 
Specifically, individuals with an internal orientation 
appear to come from similar backgrounds as individuals with 
high S-E as well as those with an open orientation. The 
same parallels also hold true for individuals with an ex-
ternal orientation, low S-E, and high Dg. Furthermore, the 
literature fairly consistently indicates that an internal 
orientation, low Dg, and high S-E are all related to better 
adjustment than an external orientation, high Dg, and low 
S-E. 
In addition to these parallels, numerous studies 
(see Chandler, 1976; Clouser & Hjelle, 1970; Fish & 
Karabenick, 1971; Ryckman & Cannon, 1975; Ryckman & Sherman, 
1973; Sherman, Pelletier, & Ryckman, 1973) have indicated 
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significant correlations between and among these three 
variables. Given these significant associations as we:' .. l as 
the noted consequences of differences in these three belief 
continua, two clusters of belief components appear to 
emerge: one characterized by a sense of internal or per-
sonal control of events, openness to experience, and a 
sense of positive self-worth; the other characterized by a 
sense of external control or lack of personal control, 
guardedness, and a sense of worthlessness. 
While the data indicates significant associations 
between and among these variables, it is also important to 
point out some of the differences between and among them. 
Rosenberg (1979) suggests that while I-E and S-E may be 
related they are not identical. He states that: 
a major reason is that sore people do not stake themselves 
on competence and mastery. To them being lovable, 
moral, self-sacrificing and helpful are major concerns; 
they may be quite contented to leave the mastery of 
life's harsh problems and challenges to others. On the 
other hand, there are those abundantly endowed with 
ability and talent who are confident of their ability 
to succeed in most tasks but who lack self-respect be-
cause they cannot be first in everything, cannot com-
mand the love of another, or are overwhelmed by a 
denigrated social identity element (pp. 31-32). 
Maccoby and Jacklin (1974) provide some empirical 
support for Rosenberg's distinction. The authors found 
that while girls and women have an equivalent level of S-E 
to that of boys and men, women score more externally than 
men. The authors suggest the role of sex-role socializa-
tion and sexist discrimination as factors contributing to 
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these I-E differences between the sexes. Similarly, while 
the I-E literature indicated that various socially dis-
advantaged groups have a more external orientation than 
others, the S-E literature indicated that minority group 
members tended to have the same level of S-E as majority 
group members. 
In a similar vein, Lee and Ehrlich (1971) have 
speculated that Dg and S-E may not be inversely related. 
Ehrlich (1978) reports that he and Lee have isolated in-
dividuals with high Dg levels and strong positive self-
attitudes, as well as those with high Dg levels and strong 
negative self-attitudes. He suggests that: 
the critical issue may be beliefs about verification. 
For some persons, there may be a relative emphasis 
placed on authority as compared with a personal test 
for validating information received. Thus, closed-
minded persons whose verification beliefs require 
reference to authority may have negative self-attitudes. 
Closed-minded persons whose verification beliefs re-
quire some mode of personal test may have positive 
self-attitudes (p. 159). 
In sum, while it is important to be aware of the 
similarities between and among the three assessed compo-
nents of belief, the differences are equally important. 
Moreover, it is important to stress a semantic as well as 
empirical point. The two above-mentioned belief system 
clusters do not represent a static typology but rather 
points of convergence in a changeable matrix of belief. 
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Belief System Change 
Several studies have important implications for be-
lief system change. In one study, Lefcourt (1967) found 
that externally oriented subjects exhibited a marked shift 
to a more internal orientation when they were informed that 
achievement reinforcement was available. Lefcourt sug-
gested that the lack of goal striving of externally 
oriented subjects was due to their being less perceptive 
than more internally oriented subjects. He further stated 
that by learning what cues where linked with reinforcement 
pessibilities, an individual could learn to generalize 
reward-gaining behavior to new situations. 
These hypotheses are supported to a degree by Smith 
(1970) who found that clients who went through a crisis 
intervention program in which they had to learn to solve 
their own problems became more internally oriented than a 
comparable group going through traditional psychotherapy. 
A second therapy study provides even more direct 
support for Lefcourt's arguments. Dua (1970) contrasted 
the effects on I-E of an action-oriented approach directed 
at improving interpersonal skills with a re-education 
therapy approach. The action-oriented treatment involved 
planning specific behaviors for improving relationships, 
while the re-educative approach was directed toward in-
fluencing the clients' attitudes. Dua found that in com-
parison to an untreated control group both the action-
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oriented approach and the re-education approach lead to a 
decrease in external orientation. However, it was the more 
action-oriented skills training approach which produced the 
most significant change. 
Two studies that deal with different populations 
indicate that learning skills which result in increased 
effectiveness as helpers lead to a more internal orienta-
tion. Gottesfeld and Dozier (1966) found that people from 
East Harlem, an urban ghetto, who were trained and then 
worked as community organizers became increasingly more 
internally directed. Similarly, Martin and Shepel (1974) 
found that nurses who received training in personal 
counseling skills made a significant shift towards in-
ternality. 
In addition to these studies, several other re-
searchers have found that college students who have par-
ticipated in various encounter study group experiences also 
evidenced a significant movement towards an internal orien-
tation (Diamond & Shapiro, 1973; Foulds, 1971; Foulds, 
Guinan & Warehime, 1974a), increased S-E (Martin & Fischer, 
1974) and decreased Dg (Foulds, Guinan, & Warehime, 1974b). 
These studies have several factors in common which 
may have contributed to significant change in belief. 
First, because of the action-oriented nature of these ap-
proaches, the individual was encouraged to take a direct 
and active role in his or her own training or treatment. 
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This active role is likely to lead to greater self-attribu-
tion which is likely to facilitate bahavior and belief sys-
tern change (Davidson & Valins, 1968, 1969). Secondly, and 
in line with Lefcourt's suggestions, the explicit nature of 
most of these approaches help to make social cues more ex-
plicit and as a result enable the individual to '!see" the 
path to social reinforcement. Finally, learning more 
effective behaviors is not only likely to influence the 
individual's environment but also their belief system. 
Interpersonal Skills Training 
Human beings are, among other things, social 
animals and a great deal of their reinforcement come from 
their interactions with others. The individual generally 
has a strong desire for positive interpersonal relation-
ships. However, despite this strong desire, people do not 
always get what they want. Several theories have discussed 
the likely consequences of frustration of important need 
areas. Specifically, social learning theory makes the 
following prediction: 
When an individual places a high value on a particular 
need area and at the same time has low expectancies 
that more desirable behavior will lead to satisfactions 
in that area, he will typically engage in avoidant be-
haviors . . . failure to be rewarded in a strong need 
area is perceived as punishing. Thus, whether we are 
talking about a simple expectation for punishment or 
the failure to receive rewards that one values highly, 
the outcome is the same--a very unpleasant affective 
state which the individual will attempt to avoid 
(Phares , 19 7 2 , p . 4 41 ) . 
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Of related interest, Beck (1967) states that there 
are three components to depression: (1) construing experi-
ences in a negative way, (2) viewing the self in a negative 
way, and (3) having negative expectations of the future. 
Given this triadic configuration, Beck points out that one 
way of changing the motivational pattern of the individual 
is by changing his/her cognition. He states that: 
As long as he expec:ts a negative outcome from any 
course of action, he is stripped of any internal 
stimulation to do anything. Conversely, when he is 
persuaded that a positive outcome may result from a 
particular endeavor, he may then experience an internal 
stimulus to pursue it (p. 236). 
While many theorists think that interpersonal rela-
tionships are one of the most basic and crucial areas of 
human functioning (Sullivan, 1953; Horney, 1937; Fromm, 
1955; and many others), it seems likely that for individuals 
with an external orientation, a low sense of S-E and/or a 
high level of Dg, interpersonal relationships are likely to 
be problematic. Therefore, given the possible universal 
desire for positive interpersonal relationships and the 
negative consequences of having a low expectation of sue--
cess in this area, the literature on the effects of what is 
called interpersonal skills training is quite pertinent. 
Carkhuff (1969b) has researched and developed a 
systematic training approach which appears to be not only 
effective but also economical. He states that: 
We can do anything in training that we can do in treat-
ment--and more. Training in interpersonal skills 
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strikes at the heart of most difficulties in living. 
Systematic training in interpersonal skills affords a 
means of implementing the necessary learning in progres-
sive gradations of experience which insure the success 
of the learning. In making explicit use of all sources 
of learning--the experiential, the didactic, and model-
ing--systematic group training in interpersonal skills 
provides the most effective, economical, and efficient 
means of achieving the individual growth of the largest 
number of persons (1969b, pp. 130-31). 
Carkhuff's thesis of directly training clients in 
interpersonal skills appears to be in line with the Dua 
(1970) and Smith (1970) studies mentioned above; that is, 
an action-oriented treatment approach which may facilitate 
self-attributed behavior change and leads to increased in-
ternality and a heightened sense of S-E. Furthermore, with 
its emphasis on empathy, skills training is likely to in-
crease the individual's understanding of others which 
Marris (1974) believes is an adaptive alternative to dog-
matism. 
Several researchers have found positive effects of 
skills training with parents (Carkhuff & Bierman, 1970; 
Carkhuff & Griffin, 1971) , prison inmates (Devine & 
Steinberg, 1974; Montgomery, 1974), delinquents (Carkhuff, 
Berenson, Griffin, Devine, Angelone, Clinton, Keeling, 
Muth, Patch & Steinberg, 1974) and ex-felons (Griffin, 
1973) 0 
In one study, Pierce and Drasgow (1969) made com-
parisons of different modes of treatment with neuropsychi-
atric in-patients. They found that subjects in a training 
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group showed significantly more improvement than drug-
thernpy, group-therapy, or individual-therapy subjects. 
After interviewing the patients, they discovered that the 
patients of the ward found those patients who received 
training to be significantly more helpful than those 
patients who had not received training. The authors recom-
mended that: 
If one wants to create a truly therapeutic atmosphere 
in either group therapy or on the wards, one must train 
the patients, since they do not exist in isolation from 
each other but rather are a major part of each other's 
environment (p. 298). 
In another study (Vitale, 1971), patients' improve-
ment in interpersonal functioning was found to be sig-
nificantly greater than that which resulted through model-
ing in group therapy. The training was also found to have 
affected a general improvement in patients' social func-
tioning. Based on this evidence, Vitale stated that: 
This consistent efficacy in producing improved social 
functioning suggests the present program as a preferred 
mode of treatment in instances where the presenting 
problem is predominantly interpersonal. Further, the 
briefness of the training combined with the importance 
of the skills it transmits suggest it as adjunct treat-
ment to all forms of therapeutic intervention (p. 170). 
The research data seems to indicate that inter-
personal skills training is effective as an adjunct to 
traditional modes of treatment if not a preferred mode of 
treatment itself. 
Finally, with a normal population, Egan (1976) has 
developed a human relations training model similar to 
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Carkhuff's and directly related to the possibility of 
effecting significant belief system changes. In fact, it 
is Egan's thesis that: 
Increasing your interpersonal skills can make you less 
vulnerable to random social influence for a number of 
reasons. Skills training gives you a greater sense of 
competence and increases your self-esteem. You become 
less dependent and freed at least to a degree, from the 
need for social approval. You also acquire the ability 
to challenge untoward attempts at influence in your 
regard. On the other hand, learning communication 
skills can open you up to more reasonable kinds of 
social influence. You can listen more carefully to 
what others have to say and with greater understanding. 
You are less defensive and therefore more willing to 
listen (p. 243). 
The research on skills training and the studies on 
changes in belief appear to have a point of convergence. 
It seems that what is needed to help change an external 
orientation to an internal one, is to show the individual 
that reinforcement is not up to luck but is contingent, in 
part, upon what he or she does. Systematically training 
individuals in those skills which they need to deal effec-
tively with their environment seems to be a direct way to 
change not only control orientation but also the individ~ 
ual's sense of self-worth. Furthermore, with increased 
effectiveness, the need to take a defensive dogmatic stance 
is likely to be diminished. 
Purpose of the Study 
The present study attempts to probe the relation-
ship between behavior change and belief system. Specifi-
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cally, the relationsh:1.p between elements within the belief 
system (i.e., I-E, s-:•:.:, and Dg) ; the role of the belief 
system on level of interpersonal skills; as well as, the 
effect of increased interpersonal functioning on the belief 
system. 
Specific Hypotheses 
1. Subjects completing a human relations training 
class (experimental I condition) will show a significant 
increase in interpersonal skills as measured by a be-
havioral rating scale based on the work of Egan (1976) and 
Carkhuff (1969b). 
2. At pretest, the external experimental I sub-
jects will have a significantly lower level of interpersonal 
skills than internal experimental I subjects. 
3. At pretest, the low S-E experimental I subjects 
will have a significantly lower level of interpersonal 
skills than high S-E experimental I subjects. 
4. At pretest, the high Dg experimental I subjects 
will have a significantly lower level of interpersonal 
skills than low Dg experimental I subjects. 
5. At posttest, the internal experimental I sub-
jects will show a greater increase (over pretest level) in 
interpersonal skills than the external experimental I sub-
jects. 
6. At posttest, the high S-E experimental I 
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subjects will show a greater increase (over pretest level) 
in interpersonal skills than the low S-E experimental I 
subjects. 
7. At posttest, the low Dg experimental I subjects 
will show a greater increase (over pretest level) in in-
terpersonal skills than high Dg experimental I subjects. 
8. Internal subjects will have significantly lower 
Dg scale scores than external subjects. 
9. Internal subjects will have significantly 
higher S-E scale scores than external subjects. 
10. At posttest, the experimental I subjects and 
subjects completing a counseling skills training course 
(experimental II condition) will score significantly 
lower on the Dg scale than control I and II subjects. 
11. At posttest, the experimental I and II subjects 
will score significantly higher on the S-E scale than con-
trol I and II subjects. 
12. At posttest, the experimental I and II external 
subjects will become significantly more internal than con-
trol I and II external subjects. 
CHAPTER III 
METHOD 
Subjects 
Subjects were 140 students who enrolled into one of 
three psychology courses: Psychology 378--Laboratory in 
Interpersonal Relations; two sections of Psychology 376--
Counseling I; and Psychology 395--Field Study in Psy-
chology. There were 54 male subjects ranging in age from 
20 to 46 years with 13 to 21 years of formal education. 
There were 86 female subjects ranging in age from 19 to 48 
years with 13 to 20 years of formal education. (For a 
further description of the subjects see Table 1.) 
The students were classified into one of four con-
ditions depending upon which course they took. Those sub-
jects enrolling in the human relations training course 
(Psychology 378) and the experiential training section of 
the counseling course (Psychology 376) were designated as 
Experimental groups I and II, respectively. While those 
who enrolled in the didactic section of the counseling 
course and the field study course (Psychology 376 and 395) 
were designated as the Control groups I and II. 
The subjects were further classified along the I-E 
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Table 1 
Mean and Standard Deviations for Age and Years of 
Formal Education 
All 
Group Males Females Subjects 
Experimental I N 15 30 45 
Age X 25.27 27.6 0 26.60 
SD 4.23 6.63 6.05 
Education X 15.73 15.70 15.71 
SD 2.25 2.05 2.10 
Experimental II N 15 21 36 
Age X 25.00 24.90 24.94 
SD 7.13 7.93 7.50 
Education X 15.67 14.81 15.17 
SD 2.13 1.50 1.81 
Control I N 14 21 35 
Age X 20.71 23.19 22.20 
SD 2.40 5.46 4.61 
Education X 13.93 14.48 14.26 
SD 1.14 1.21 1.20 
Control II N 10 14 24 
Age X 20.70 21.86 21.38 
SD 0.95 3.08 2.46 
Education X 14.60 14.64 14.63 
SD 0.52 0.84 0.71 
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continuum into three I-E groups. Those subjects scoring 
in the lowest third on the Rotter (1966) scale were classi-
fied as Internals (0 to 7 on the Rotter), those scoring in 
the middle third were classified as Moderates (8 to 10 on 
the Rotter) and those receiving the highest scores were 
classified as Externals (11 to 21 on the Rotter). In ad-
dition to I-E classification, a median-split was used to 
further classify the experimental I subjects into high 
and low levels of Dg and S-E. 
All subjects were thus classified into one of four 
conditions (Experimental I or II or Control I or II) and 
into one of three I-E groups (Internal, Moderate, or 
External) with the experimental I subjects also be-
ing classified into different levels of Dg and S-E. 
Instruments 
The I-E scale developed by Rotter (1966) was used 
to assess subjects' reinforcement orientation. It con-
sists of 23 question pairs plus six filler questions, and 
uses a forced-choice format. Some examples are: "Many 
of the unhappy things in people's lives are partly due to 
bad luck," vs. "People's misfortunes result from the mis-
takes they make." and "It is hard to know whether or not 
a person really likes you." vs. "How many friends you have 
depends on how nice a person you are." This questionnaire 
is shown in Appendix D. 
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The second instrument used was the Dogmatism (Dg) 
scale (Form E) developed by Rokeach (1960) to assess dif-
ferences in the openness or closedness of belief systems. 
The Dg scale consists of 40 Likert-type items. Responses 
are scored along a +3 to -3 agree-disagree scale, with the 
0 point excluded. These scores are converted to a 1 to 7 
point scale by adding the constant 4 to each score. The 
range of possible scores is therefore from 40 to 280 with 
high scores indicating a closed orientation. Some ex-
amples are: "The main thing in life is for a person to 
want to do something important." "A person who thinks 
primarily of his own happiness is beneath contempt." 
"Most people just don't know what's good for them." This 
instrument can be found in Appendix E. 
The third measure used was the Revised Janis-Field 
Scale (Eagley, 1967). This is a 20 item, five-point 
Likert scale used to measure S-E. Scores may range from 
20 to 100 with high scores indicating a high level of S-E. 
A copy of this scale can be found in Appendix F. 
While the I-E, Dg, and S-E scales were used as pre-
test and posttest measures for all subjects, a five point 
behavioral rating scale, was used as a pretest and posttest 
instrument with the Experimental I group only. This scale 
was used to assess nine basic interpersonal skills (see 
Egan, 1976 and Carkhuff, 1969b). The mean of the scale, 
3.0, refers to a minimally effective level of interpersonal 
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functioning. Scores below 3.0 are indicative of less ef-
fectiveness and greater interpersonal disorganization while 
scores above 3.0 are indicative of a higher level of inter-
personal effectiveness. This scale is shown in Appendix C. 
In addition to this scale, a copy of Carkhuff's scoring 
norms (1969, pp. 315-329) are shown in Appendix A as well 
as an example rating guide (Appendix B). 
Procedures 
The experimenter administered the I-E, Dg, and S-E 
scales to all subjects during the first and last meeting of 
their respective classes. Subjects were told that the ex-
perimenter was gathering data on people's attitudes and be-
liefs. They were instructed to answer all questions, that 
there were no right or wrong answers, and to indicate 
which statements they agreed with most or best described 
their experience. 
After the first meeting of their classes, the ex-
perimental I and II subjects were randomly assigned to 
their permanent small skills training groups of 5 to 7 
members with one or two trainers. (Because of a lack of a 
sufficient number of trainers experimental II subjects did 
not have a regular trainer.) 
The training received by the experimental I subjects 
consisted of both didactic instruction in the form of lec-
tures and experiential step-by-step practice in the nine 
basic interpersonal skills discussed by Egan (1976). The 
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subjects moved from practicing simple listening skills in 
dyads and triads to the development of more complex inter-
personal skills {e.g., confrontation, immediacy, etc.) 
within the context of an open group {see Egan, 1976). In 
addition to this, the subjects read materials on the skills 
and did pertinent workbook assignments {Egan, 1975b, 1976; 
Wood, 1974). 
The experimental II subjects received training sim-
ilar to that of the subjects under the first condition. 
However, while the emphasis in training for the first 
group was the development of skills useful in peer rela-
tionships, the training focus under the second condition 
was the development of communication skills useful in a 
helping relationship. 
The training methodology in this group closely 
paralleled that used in the first condition. Experimental 
II subjects received didactic instruction in the form of 
lectures on therapy and counseling as well as experiential 
step-by-step practice in eight basis helping skills {Egan, 
1975a). The subjects practiced these skills while role-
playing helpers and clients. 
The trainers of each of the small groups made an 
assessment of the subjects' interpersonal 
skills, after the second and last meeting of their small 
training groups. All trainers made independent evalua-
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tions and were blind to the subjects' tests scores as well 
as the hypotheses of the study. 
The subjects in the third condition went through a 
traditional didactic academic course which reviewed various 
theories on counseling and psychotherapy. However, sub-
jects in this condition did not receive any direct ex-
periential training in either social or helping skills. 
Subjects in the fourth condition, the field study 
course, worked as volunteers in an applied setting for 
various agencies in the community. As part of their 
learning experience, these students participated in a 
weekly support group with their peers in which they dis-
cussed their experiences and expressed their feeling within 
the context of a peer support group. 
To reiterate, subjects in both experimental con-
ditions received systematic training in either interpersonal 
or helping skills as well as appropriate didactic input. 
Subjects in the third condition received didactic input 
on various theories of counseling and psychotherapy while 
subjects in the fourth condition had a supportive group 
experience without systematic skills training. 
At the end of the semester, all subjects were re-
tested with the I-E, Dg, and S-E scales. Prior to taking 
this posttest, none of the subjects knew that they would be 
asked to retake the scales that they had taken earlier as 
a pretest. There was a 13 week time lapse between the 
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pretest and posttest and during this period, there was no 
contact between ~he experimenter and the subjects. 
Scoring 
Both pretest and posttest interpersonal skills 
scores were based on trainers' ratings of the experimental 
I subjects' skills. Each of the small group trainers rated 
the skills of the members of their respective groups. In 
those groups having two trainers, the trainers were in-
structed to make independent assessments of members' 
skills. In order to obtain a single pretest and a single 
posttest skill score for all experimental I subjects, the 
ratings of those groups having two trainers were averaged 
and the mean score designated as their skill score. Since 
the trainers were familiar with the Carkhuff and Egan as-
sessment procedures, no special training was given to them 
for this study. They were simply asked to rate subjects' 
skills according to the method shown in Appendix c. 
CHAPTER IV 
RESULTS 
Analysis of I-E Data 
In order to determine if a significant change in 
I-E occurred as a result of the training received by the 
experimental groups, the I-E change scores were subjected 
to an analysis of variance unweighted means solution (Winer, 
1971). The pretest and posttest means and change scores 
for these data are presented in Table 2. Results of the 
analysis of variance for the I-E data are shown in Table 
3. The factor A main effect is non-significant (F [2,128] 
=1.44, p. = .25) indicating that the Internal, Moderate, 
and External subjects do not significantly differ with re-
spect to changes in their level of I-E. The factor B main 
effect is non-significant (F [3,128]=1.66, p. = .25). This 
shows that the groups under the different conditions (Ex-
perimental I and II or Control I and II) do not signif-
icantly differ with respect to their changes in level of 
I-E. Furthermore, the AB interaction is also non-signif-
icant (F [6,128]=1.27, p. = N.S.) and this indicates that 
there was no interaction between level of I-E and condi-
tion. 
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Table 2 
Mean I-E Pretest, Post test and Change Scores 
for I-E and Condition 
N Pretest Post test Change 
Internal 19 5.37 5.89 +0.53 
Experimental I Moderate 10 8.70 6.20 -2.50 
(N=45) External 16 12.81 9.63 -3.19 
Internal 13 4.92 5.23 +0.31 
Experimental II Moderate 12 9.08 10.58 +1.50 
(N=36) External 11 14.18 12.73 -1.45 
Internal 14 5.29 4.86 -0.43 
Control I Moderate 11 9.45 8.36 -1.09 
(N=35) External 10 13.70 13.00 -0.70 
Internal 3 5.33 4.67 -0.67 
Control II Moderate 8 9.00 9.63 +0.63 
(N=24) External 13 13.92 13.85 -0.08 
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Table 3 
Analysis of Variance of I-E Change Scores as a 
Function of Skills Training 
(Unweighted Means Solution) 
Source of Variation ss df NS F p 
I-E (A) 34.54 2 17.27 1.44 .25 
Condition (B) 59.98 3 19.99 1.66 .25 
AB 91.67 6 15.28 1.27 
Within Subjects 1,538.09 128 12.02 
(N=l40) 
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The data thus fails to support the twelfth hypoth-
eses of this study. Specifically, the I-E groups did not 
differ in their changes of I-E and the type of learning 
experience which the subjects had did not cause signif-
icantly different changes in I-E. 
Analysis of Dg and S-E Data 
In order to determine the effects of skills train-
ing on Dg and S-E, as well as the relationship between 
I-E and Dg and S-E, the pretest and posttest Dg and S-E 
scores were each subjected to a repeated measures analysis 
of variance unweighted means solution (Winer, 1971}. The 
pretest and posttest means and change scores for the Dg 
data are presented in Table 4. The results of the analy-
.sis on Dg scores are shown in Table 5. The factor A main 
effect is very highly significant (F [2,128]=6.10, p. = 
.005) which indicates that the I-E groups differ very sig-
nificantly in their levels of Dg. The factor B main ef-
fect is non-significant (F [3,128=2.09, p. = .11) which 
indicates that the subjects under the four conditions of 
this study did not differ in their Dg level. None of the 
other F ratios were significant which means that there 
were no significant changes in the Dg level of any of the 
subjects under any of the four conditions in the study. 
However because the factor A main effect was sig-
nificant, a Neuman-Keuls post-hoc analysis was performed 
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Table 4 
Mean Dogmatism Pretest Posttest and Change 
Scores for I-E and Condition 
N Pretest Post test Change 
Internal 19 124.68 125.05 +0.37 
Experimental I Moderate 10 131.50 132.40 +0.90 
(N=45) External 16 146.63 142.69 -3.94 
Internal 13 129.85 121.69 -8.16 
Experimental II Moderate 12 153.92 143.58 -10.34 
(N=46) External 11 147.18 152.73 +5.55 
Internal 14 140.71 144.64 +3.93 
Control I Moderate 11 133.45 137.91 +4.46 
(N=35) External 10 155.10 155.90 +0.80 
Internal 3 122.00 121.67 -0.33 
Control II Moderate 8 139.63 134.13 -5.50 
(N=24) External 13 136.08 137.77 +1.69 
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Table 5 
Analysis of Variance of Dg Scores as a Function 
of I-E and Skills Training 
(Unweighted Means Solution) 
Source of Variation ss df MS F p 
Between Subjects 
I-E (A) 12,278.07 2 6,139.04 6.10 .005 
Condition (B) 6,312.94 3 2,104.31 2.09 .11 
AB 5,299.60 6 883.27 .88 
Subj. w/groups 128,765.40 128 1,005.98 
(error between) 
Within Subjects 
Pre/Post (C) 44.22 1 44.22 .28 
AC 126.79 2 63.40 .41 
BC 393.08 3 131.03 .84 
ABC 811.77 6 135.30 .87 
ex subj. w/groups 19,909.00 128 155.54 
(error within) 
(N=l40) 
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to further probe this result. The Neuman-Keuls analysis 
of significant differences in Dg levels of the three I-E 
groups is summarized in Table 6. The data supports the 
eighth hypothesis that internal subjects are significantly 
less dogmatic than their more external peers (p. = .05). 
The pretest and posttest means and change scores 
for the S-E data are presented in Table 7. The results of 
the analysis on S-E scores which is summarized in Table 8 
closely parallel the results of analysis on Dg scores. The 
factor A main effect is very highly significant (F [2,128] 
=6.43, p. = .005) indicating that the I-E groups differ 
significantly in their levels of S-E. Data from a Neuman-
Keuls post-hoc analysis, which was used to probe this 
difference, is shown in Table 9. The results of this 
analysis which supports hypothesis 9 indicates that both 
Internal and Moderate subjects have a significantly higher 
level of S-E than External subjects (p. = .05). 
In addition to this, the factor C main effect 
approaches significance (F [1,128]=3.89, p. = .06) which 
indicates that a near-significant pretest-posttest change 
in S-E occurred. However, because none of the other F 
ratios were significant, this near-significant change in 
S-E occurred independent of condition and level of I-E. 
By inspection of the cell means (Table 7), it can be seen 
that in most cases the level of S-E increased at posttest. 
I-E Groups 
Internal 
Moderate 
External 
*P=. 05 
69 
Table 6 
Neuman-Keuls Post-hoc Analysis of 
Mean Dg Scores 
Means 
128.79 
138.32 
146.76 
Internal 
128.79 
Moderate 
138.32 
9.53 
External 
146.76 
17.97* 
8.44 
70 
Table 7 
Mean S-E Pretest Posttest and Change 
Scores for I-E Condition 
N Pretest Post test Change 
Internal 19 77.00 76.42 -0.58 
Experimental I Moderate 10 77.07 78.50 +1.43 
(N=45) External 16 63.88 68.94 +5.06 
Internal 13 79.00 79.64 +0.64 
Experimental II Moderate 12 70.18 73.91 +3.73 
(N=36) External 11 66.90 69.40 +2.50 
Internal 14 76.15 76.69 +0.54 
Control I Moderate 11 77.25 77.67 +0.42 
(N=35) External 10 69.09 69.18 +0.09 
Internal 3 73.67 78.00 +4.33 
Control II Moderate 8 76.75 76.00 -0.75 
(N=24) External 13 72.31 72.23 -0.08 
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Table 8 
Analysis of Variance of S-E Scores as a Function 
of I-E and Skills Training 
(Unweighted Means Solution) 
Source of Variation 
Between Subjects 
I-E (A) 
Condition (B) 
AB 
Subj. w/groups 
(error between) 
Within Subjects 
Pre/Post (C) 
AC 
BC 
ABC 
c x subj. w/groups 
(error within) 
ss df F p 
2,922.83 2 1,461.42 6.43 .005 
88.26 3 
815.29 6 
29,085.50 128 
110.27 1 
7.50 2 
29.61 3 
170.35 6 
3,626.60 128 
29.42 
135.88 
227.23 
110.27 3.89 .06 
3.75 
9.87 
28.39 1.00 
28.33 
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Table 9 
Neuman-Keuls Post-hoc Analysis of Mean S-E Scores 
I-E Groups 
External 
Moderate 
Internal 
*p=.OS 
Means 
68.99 
76.00 
77.07 
External 
68.99 
Moderate 
76.00 
7.01* 
Internal 
77.07 
8.08* 
1.07 
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In sum, Internal subjects were found to be signif-
icantly more open-minded than External subjects as well as 
both Internal and Moderate subjects having a significantly 
higher level of S-E than External subjects. While there 
was no significant pretest-posttest change in the Dg 
levels of the subjects, there was a near-significant change 
in the S-E levels of the subjects. However, this occurred 
independently of condition and level of I-E. 
Inter-Judge Reliability 
for Skills Data 
Mean skills scores for the six training groups 
having two rater-trainers are shown in Table 10. When 
comparison data for these groups was ordered according 
to the scoring categories in Appendix B, the inter-judge 
reliability based on the Spearman rho statistic (Guilford, 
1956) ranged from .92 to .99 with a mean rank-order cor-
relation of .96 for the six training groups (see Table 
11). According to Carkhuff's (1969b) research, an inter-
judge reliability of .96 would be considered as highly 
reliable. Carkhuff's raters usually obtain an inter-
judge reliability at or above .85 (Cannon and Carkhuff, 
1969). In addition to this, Table 11 indicates that all 
of the six rank-order correlations were significant at 
either the .01 or .OS level. Taken as a whole, the data 
indicates excellent inter-judge reliability. 
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Table 10 
Inter-Judge Comparison of Mean Ratings for Pretest 
Post test Interpersonal Skills Ratings (N=28) 
Small Group Pretest Post test 
Rater 1 Rater 2 Rater 1 Rater 2 
I (N=5) 3.11 2.94 3.77 3.62 
Rater 3 Rater 4 Rater 3 Rater 4 
II (N=4) 3.24 3.83 3.73 4.20 
Rater 5 Rater 6 Rater 5 Rater 6 
III (N=4) 2.67 2.50 4.03 3.15 
Rater 7 Rater 8 Rater 7 Rater 8 
IV (N=5) 2.97 2.61 4.83 4.02 
Rater 9 Rater 10 Rater 9 Rater 10 
v (N=5) 2.49 2.80 3.81 3.48 
Rater 11 Rater 12 Rater 11 Rater 12 
VI (N=5) 3.77 2.97 4.18 3.71 
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Table 11 
Small Training Groups Inter-Judge Reliability for 
Pretest and Posttest Interpersonal 
Skill Ratings (N=28) 
Small Group Rho p N 
I .92 .05 5 
II .92 .05 4 
III .97 .05 4 
IV .99 .01 5 
v .97 .01 5 
VI .98 .01 5 
Range .92-.99 
Mean Rho .96 
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Analysis of Skills Data 
In order to obtain a single pretest and a single 
posttest skill score for all experimental I subjects, the 
ratings of those subjects having two trainers were aver-
aged and the mean score designated as their skill score. 
The final skill score pretest and posttest means for the 
various belief system configurations of experimental I 
subjects are shown in Table 12. 
To determine if skills training effected a sig-
nificant change in interpersonal functioning as well as the 
effects of the individual's belief system on that possible 
change, the pretest and posttest skill scores for the ex-
perimental I subjects were subjected to a repeated measures 
analysis of variance unweighted means solution (Winer, 
1971). The results of the analysis of variance for the 
skills data are summarized in Table 13. The factor A main 
effect is non-significant (F [2,33]=0.21, p.=NS) as are 
the factor B main effect (F [1,33]=0.13, p.=NS) and factor 
C main effect (F [1,33]=0.05, p.=NS). What this indicates 
is that the subjects' level of I-E (Internal, Moderate, or 
External) , S-E (High or Low) or Dg (High or Low) does not 
result in significantly different levels of interpersonal 
skills. In addition to this, it can be seen that none of 
the interactions among the three components of belief re-
sulted in any significant differences in skills level. 
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Table 12 
Mean I-E, S-E, Dg Pretest and Posttest Skill Scores 
N Pretest Post test 
Internal 19 2.75 3.49 
Moderate 10 2.78 3.89 
External 16 2.81 3.71 
High S-E 23 2.89 3.64 
Low S-E 22 2.66 3.76 
High Dg 23 2.71 3.73 
Low Dg 22 2.84 3.67 
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Table 13 
Analysis of Variance of Skills Scores 
(Unweighted Means Solution} 
Source of Variation ss df MS F p 
Between Subjects 
I-E (A} .41 2 .21 .53 
S-E (B) .OS 1 .05 .13 
Dg(C} .02 1 .02 .OS 
AB .54 2 .27 .68 
AC 1.34 2 .67 1.68 .25 
BC .02 1 .02 .OS 
ABC .91 2 .46 1.15 
Subj. w/groups 13.19 33 .40 
Within Subjects 
Pre/Post (D) 11.55 1 11.55 88.85 .001 
AD .32 2 .16 1.23 
BD .41 1 .41 3.15 .09 
CD .11 1 .11 .85 
ABD .02 2 .01 .08 
ACD .57 2 .29 2.19 .25 
GCD .25 1 .25 1.97 .25 
ABCD 2.02 2 1.01 7.77 .005 
D x subj. w/groups 4.41 33 .13 
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In other words, none of the three components of belief nor 
any configuration of belief system resulted in any signif-
icant between subject differences in interpersonal skills. 
Thus the data fails to support the second, third, and 
fourth hypotheses of this study. 
However, the within subjects data indicates that 
the factor D main effect if very highly significant 
(F [1,33]=88.85, p.=.OOl) indicating that regardless of 
belief system configuration and in support of the first 
hypothesis, the subjects had a very highly significant 
increase in their interpersonal skills. In addition to 
this, there is a near-significant BD interaction (F [1,33] 
=3.15, p.=.09). A Neuman-Keuls analysis (Table 15) in-
dicated that not only were the posttest skill scores of 
both the high S-E and low S-E subjects significantly 
higher than their pretest scores, but also that the high 
S-E subjects' pretest scores were significantly higher 
than the pretest skill scores of the low S-E subjects. 
However, this pretest difference between S-E groups was 
not maintained at posttest. In other words, the post-hoc 
analysis of the near-significant BD interaction shows that 
the S-E groups differ in their level of skills at pretest, 
but that this difference is not maintained and that both 
groups make significant gains in their skills. 
Finally, of the remaining within subjects inter-
actions, only the ABCD interaction was significant 
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{F [2,33]=7.77, p.=.OOS). This indicates a complex fourth 
order interaction between the various level of I-E, S-E, 
Dg, and time {Pre and Post). With the exception of a very 
highly significant increase in skills across all groups, 
no clearly interpretable pattern could be determined from 
the data. This was due to the complexity of the inter-
action and the fact that some of the cells had only one 
member {see Table 14). 
Summary of Results 
An analysis of variance performed on the I-E change 
scores of the experimental I and II and the control I and 
II subjects indicated that no significant changes in I-E 
occurred regardless of I-E level or condition. 
A second and third analysis of variance performed 
on the pretest and posttest Dg and S-E scores, respectively, 
indicated significant differences in the level of Dg and 
S-E between I-E groups. Neuman-Keuls analysis of these 
data indicated that internal subjects were significantly 
less dogmatic than external subjects and that both internal 
and moderate subjects had a significantly higher level of 
S-E than external subjects. In addition to this, a near-
significant increase in S-E occurred independent of con-
dition and level of I-E. 
A fourth analysis of variance performed on the 
pretest and posttest skills scores of the experimental I 
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Table 14 
Mean I-E, S-E, and Dg Interaction Pretest 
and Posttest Skill Scores 
N Pretest Post test 
High Dg (4) 2.63 2.81 
High S-E 
Internal (N-12) Low Dg (8) 2.96 3.85 
(N=l9) 
High Dg (4) 2.60 3.59 
Low S-E 
(N=7} Low Dg (3) 2.81 3.72 
High Dg (4) 3.13 3.89 
High S-E 
(N=8) Low Dg ( 4) 2.88 4.10 
Moderate 
(N=lO) High Dg Il) 2.06 4.22 
Low S-E 
(N=2} Low Dg (1) 3.03 3.36 
High Dg (2) 3.00 4.17 
High S-E 
(N=3) Low Dg (1) 2.75 3.00 
External 
(N=l6) High Dg ( 8) 2.86 3.68 
Low S-E 
(N=l3) Low Dg (5) 2.62 3.09 
82 
Table 15 
Neuman-Keuls Post-hoc Analysis of S-E Pretest 
and Posttest Mean Skill Scores 
S-E Groups 2 1 3 4 
Means 2.66 2.89 3.64 3.76 
Pretest Low S-E (2) 
Pretest High S-E (1) 
2.66 
2.89 
Posttest High S-E (3) 3.64 
Posttest Low S-E 3.76 
*p=.05 
**p=.Ol 
.23* .98** 1.10** 
.75** .87** 
.12 
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subjects indicated that a very highly significant improve-
ment in interpersonal skills occurred between testings in 
all belief groups. Furthermore, this analysis indicated 
a near-significant interaction between S-E level on change 
in skills. A Neuman-Keuls analysis of this result in-
dicated not only a significant increase in skills for both 
S-E groups at posttest but also that low S-E subjects had 
a lower level of social skills than high S-E subjects at 
pretest. 
Thus, while the first, third, eighth, and ninth 
hypotheses of this study were confirmed, the data does 
not support the remaining hypotheses. More specifically, 
these results are summarized according to the hypotheses 
of this study as follows: 
1. Participants in a human relations training 
program (experimental I condition) showed a significant 
increase in their interpersonal skills. 
2. At pretest, the external group of experimental 
I subjects did not have a significantly lower level of 
interpersonal skills than the internal group of experi-
mental I subjects. 
3. At pretest, the low S-E experimental I sub-
jects had a near-significantly lower level of interpersonal 
skills than high S-E experimental I subjects. 
4. At pretest, the high Dg experimental I sub-
jects did not have a significantly lower level of inter-
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personal skills than the low Dg experimental I ~ubjects. 
5. At posttest, the internal experimental I 
subjects did not show a greater increase in interpersonal 
skills than the external experimental I subjects. 
6. At posttest, the high S-E experimental I 
subjects did not show a greater increase in interpersonal 
skills than the low S-E experimental I subjects. 
7. At posttest, the low Dg experimental I sub-
jects did not show a greater increase in interpersonal 
skills than the high Dg experimental I subjects. 
8. Internal subjects were found to have signif-
icantly lower Dg scale scores than external subjects. 
9. Internal and moderate subjects were found to 
have significantly higher S-E scale scores than external 
subjects. 
10. At posttest, experimental I and II subjects 
did not score significantly lower on the Dg scale than 
control I and II subjects. 
11. At posttest, the experimental I and II sub-
jects did not score significantly higher on the S-E scale 
than control I and II subjects. 
12. At posttest, the experimental I and II ex-
ternal subjects did not become significantly more internal 
than control I and II subjects. 
CHAPTER V 
DISCUSSION 
Skills Data 
The results of the skills training data strongly 
confirm the first hypothesis of this study. Namely, human 
relations training, as advocated by Egan and Carkhuff, does 
affect a positive increase in the experimental I subjects' 
interpersonal skills, as measured by trainers'ratings. In 
addition to this, the results also provide some tentative 
support of the third hypothesis of this study, that is, at 
pretest low S-E subjects' scores were somewhat lower than 
high S-E subjects. However, these same data fail to con-
firm all the other skills hypotheses. Specifically, the 
various levels of I-E, S-E, and Dg failed to significantly 
differentiate skills improvement, and only S-E appears to 
have somewhat of an influence on pretest skills level (see 
Table 12) • 
In regards to the highly significant change in 
rated behavior, pretest means in T.able 12 indicated that 
the experimental I subjects, regardless of level of I-E, 
S-E, and Dg, all tended to interact with others in the 
"good advice" level of communication (see Appendices A and B) 
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prior to skills training. At this level, they would tend 
to respond to others with advice and would rarely communi-
cate a minimal understanding of others. However, at post-
test, this pattern of communication changed significantly 
for all experimental I groups. Behaviorally, after skills 
training, the experimental I subjects would be much more 
likely to communicate at the "interchangeable" level of 
communication. At this new level, they would be likely to 
accurately respond to others' thoughts and feelings with 
real warmth and genuine understanding. 
As mentioned above, most of the pretest and all of 
the posttest skills-belief system hypothesis were not sup-
ported by the data. Several factors may have contributed 
to this failure to find significan-c~. It is possible that 
subtle differences in the interpersonal functioning of the 
various belief groups were not detected by the behavioral 
rating scale, while a gross change in the overall level of 
skills was. Therefore, failure to detect differences be-
tween the var~~usgroups might be an artifact of insensitive 
instrumentation. 
Similarly, the three scales used to assess I-E, 
S-E, and Dg are all measures of general attitudes and be-
liefs. As such, these scales may show modest correlations 
across a wide range of situations, but fail to make ac-
curate predictions of behavior in more specific situations. 
In other words, the specific interpersonal skills which 
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were rated may not have been mediated by the general atti-
tudes and beliefs assessed. 
However, it is also possible that the data are 
accurately reflecting a lack of difference between the 
various groups. Using Piagetian terminology, Wachtel 
{1973) has argued that normal subjects are more likely to 
accomodate themselves to their environment than are "dis-
turbed" individuals who are likely to act in an "over-
assimilat~d" manner. It is therefore possible that for the 
normal subjects in this study that their assimilated belief 
systems did not differentially mediate their interpersonal 
behavior. Furthermore, given the "demand characteristics" 
of the experimental I condition, any personality differ-
ences may have been washed out by the subjects' accomoda-
tions to the skills training. This is not to say that per-
sonality differences in interpersonal behavior may not have 
existed between the various groups in non-training situa-
tions but rather that all groups adapted to a rather 
stimulating environment. 
In other words, while it might be fair to assume 
that the increase in interpersonal functioning would likely 
lead to an overall improvement in the subjects' inter-
personal relationships {see Carkhuff and Berenson, 1976), 
this is not necessarily the case. It is possible that even 
though all the experimental I groups have the same level of 
skills, if a subject believes that in most situations those 
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skills will have little influence on his or her environment, 
he or she may not use his/her skills in non-training 
situations. Therefore, while in the training situation 
individual differences may become suppressed, in non-
training situations belief system differences may emerge. 
While there was apparently significant improvement 
in the rated interpersonal functioning of the experimental 
I subjects, due to the quasi-experimental design used as 
well as some methodological flaws, the validity of these 
results may be questioned. Specifically, because skills 
data was only collected on the experimental I subjects, it 
can only be assumed that the subjects under the other con-
ditions were drawn from the same population with respect to 
their level of interpersonal skills. Furthermore, it can 
only be assumed that the subjects in the control groups did 
not experience a comparable change in either their inter-
personal or helping skills and that the experimental II 
subjects did experience a comparable increase in their help-
ing skills. Because of this lack of data, it is not pos-
sible to unequivocally attribute the change in level of 
skills to training rather than to various confounds such as 
self-selection. 
One answer to this question is that despite the 
validity of this criticism, the effectiveness of this 
training approach has been repeatedly demonstrated (see 
Carkhuff, 1969a,b; Carkhuff & Berenson, 1976). Given this 
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demonstrated effectiveness, it seems reasonable that the 
above-mentioned assumptions are valid. 
Another criticism, that might be made of the 
methodology used, is that the subjects may have been taught 
to take the test. That is, in fact, what ac~ually happens. 
The behavioral scale used to evaluate interpersonal skills 
was constructed to pick up what was actually taught during 
training. Since the experimental I subjects were trained 
in the very skills assessed by the behavioral scale, they 
were expected to and actually did show a marked improve-
ment on the posttest. 
While there is also some merit to this criticism, 
Carkhuff (1969a,b) has shown that the skills measured by 
his scales actually are observable in the subjects' real 
interactions with others. In other words, Carkhuff's 
scales appear to validly measure skills that are transferred 
to real life situations as a result of training. Thus, it 
can be argued that the rating scale provides a valid assess-
ment of the effectiveness of training. 
Another and potentially more serious problem with 
the skills data has to do with scoring. While the trainers 
were unaware of the specific hypotheses of this study, they 
did know that they were making pretest and posttest assess-
ments of their own groups. Furthermore, as raters familiar 
with this approach, they probably were aware that an in-
crease in skills would be expected. Therefore, as trainers 
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of the very groups that they were rating, one may validly 
argue that the trainers may have been biased, that is, the 
trainers might have a personal investment in seeing im-
provement in their trainees' skills. In other words, the 
only irnporvernent in the subjects' interpersonal skills may 
have been in the minds of the trainer-raters and not in the 
subjects' actual behavior. 
While this is a very valid argument, and while 
having trainers rate their own groups may seriously corn-
promise the validity of the results of this study, the 
inter-judge reliability data tends to undercut this 
criticism. Specifially, in all of the training groups (see 
Table 11) the Spearman rank order correlations were sig-
nificant at either the .01 or.OS level with the mean rho 
correlation of .96 for the six groups. This level of 
reliability indicates excellent agreement between indepen-
dent trainer assessments, which would tend to indicate that 
the data was validly reflecting an actual change in social 
skills. 
In sum, despite some design and methodological 
problems, it seems safe to conclude that the significant 
rated improvement in social skills most probably represents 
a valid assessment of actual behavior change. However, 
with one exception, the three measures of belief generally 
failed to differentiate skills level and rate of improve-
ment. This may be due to the general nature of the scales 
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used. Whether these hypotheses would be supported with 
more specific measures needs to be determined. Parentheti-
cally, and in support of the general vs. specific inter-
pretation, the one belief system hypothesis which was sup-
ported involved the S-E scale which contains several items 
which deal specifically with interpersonal relationships. 
This general vs. specific issue will be further discussed 
in the next section. 
Belief System Data 
Two general categories of results can be seen in 
the belief system data. The first category deals with the 
significant results which deal with the structure of belief 
systems. The second category of results which are non-
significant involve changes in that structure. 
Specifically, Table 6 and 9 show that internal sub-
jects relative to their more external counterparts report a 
significantly lower level of Dg and a significantly higher 
level of S-E. These results confirm the eigth and ninth 
hypotheses of this study as well as providing additional 
support to the validity of the I-E, Dg and S-E constructs. 
That is, these results conform with theoretical expecta-
tions regarding belief system structure. People who tend 
to believe that they are in control of their lives also 
tend to not only think well of themselves, but also tend to 
think in a relatively openminded fashion. People who tend 
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to believe that they are not in relative control of their 
lives tend to think poorly of themselves as well as tend 
to think in a relatively rigid and closeminded fashion. 
While the above-mentioned skills training data 
indicated that a highly significant change in behavior 
occurred, the belief system data does not show a comparable 
change in belief system structure. Specifically, Tables 
3 and 5 indicate that no significant changes occurred in 
either I-E or Dg. While, Table 8 indicates that a near-
significant change in S-E. This change occurred inde-
pendent of condition. In other words, skills training 
did not appear to result in a significant change in be-
lief systems. 
There are several possible explanations for this 
lack of significant belief system change despite signif-
icant behavior change. One possible explanation for the 
failure to find significant belief system change may be 
related to the notion of "orders of abstraction" {Kor-
sybinski, 1933). As mentioned above, all three belief 
system scales are measures of generalized factors and are 
therefore by definition non-specific. It is therefore 
possible that skills training may have effected some very 
specific cognitions that the subjects had without signif-
icantly influencing more global or generalized beliefs. 
If we were to think of an individual's belief system as 
being hierarchically organized as suggested by Rosenberg 
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(1979) and Rokeach (1960, 1968, 1973), than specific cog-
nitions and general cognitions would represent different 
"levels of abstraction." Thus while skills training may 
have had an immediate effect on some specific concrete 
level, this effect may not have effected a change on a 
more general level. 
A second and somewhat related explanation has to 
do with the process of generalization. Spiegel has sug-
gested that a "ripple effect" occurs when individuals 
after experiencing mastery in one area of their life, feel 
motivated to start making significant changes in other 
areas of their life (Spiegel & Linn, 1969). Given that 
the experimental I subjects experienced a significant in-
crease in interpersonal functioning in the training situ-
ation, it is likely to take some time to generalize those 
changes across different areas of their lives. Further-
more, assuming that skills training effected situation-
specific cognitions and that it will take time to general-
ize the new level of skills across situations, it is also 
likely to take time to affect generalized or cross-situ-
ational beliefs. More simply, given a lag between behavior 
change and resultant belief system change, it may take 
subjects lonc;·er to change cross-situational beliefs than 
more situation-specific ones. 
Another way to interpret the data is that it may 
be accurately reflecting the stability of the subjects' 
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belief systems and that in point of fact, there was no 
change. One of the presuppositions of this study has been 
that lasting change is not automatic and that there are 
likely to be systemic forces of checks and balances which 
may resist change. One "dynamic" explanation of this re-
sistance has been offered by cognitive dissonance theory 
(Festinger, 1957}. If a person behaves in a way that con-
flicts with his/her beliefs and if there is insufficient 
external justification for this behavior, then he/she will 
experience dissonance and feel motivated to change his/her 
beliefs to conform with his/her behavior. Given this, it 
is possible that despite significant behavior change, the 
experimental subjects may have been able to attribute this 
change to external factors and thereby avoid changing their 
beliefs. 
A related "dynamic" reason for the failure to find 
a significant change in belief is also related to re-
sistance. Davis (1970} distinguished between two groups 
of external subjects--"defensive externals" and "con-
gruent externals." The former group espouses an external 
belief but act like internals, while the latter group's 
behavior coincides with their external expectancy. Davis 
suggests that the "defensive external" apparently while 
striving for success like an internal defend themselves 
against responsibility for failure by espousing an external 
belief. If therefore seems possible that one factor in-
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volved in not finding a significant change in the I-E 
scores of the external subjects, despite their significant 
change in social skills, might be due to their resistance 
to acknowledging greater responsibility for possible 
failure. Somewhat similar arguments have been suggested 
by Epstein (1973) in regards to the consistency of S-E 
and by Ehlrich and Lee (1969) in regards to Dg. 
A final factor which may be related to a failure 
to find a significant change in belief system may be re-
lated to interpersonal "resistance." From the literature 
on the three belief system components, it was shown that 
significant others play an important role in the develop-
ment of the belief system. However, in addition to play-
ing an important role in its development, significant 
others also play an important role in the maintenance of 
the belief systems. It is therefore possible that another 
factor involved in the failure to find a significant change 
in belief was due, in part, to the "resistance" of signif-
icant others. That is, within the context of established 
relationships, certain behavioral patterns may be main-
tained and reinforced while deviance from those patterns 
may be resisted and punished (see Bandler, Grindler, & 
Satir, 1976; Haley, 1963, 1973, 1976; Mash, Hamerlynck, 
& Handy, 1976; Mash, Handy, & Hamerlynck, 1976). Because 
of this possible resistance, the generalization of the 
newly developed social skills to non-training situations 
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may be impeded while the stability of established inter-
personal patterns as well as the structure of the belief 
system may be maintained. 
Carkhuff (Carkhuff & Berenson, 1976) has suggested 
that while interpersonal skills are important, they may be 
insufficient to help some people to fully develop their 
human potential. He recommends training in other areas of 
life such as physical and intellectual skills development. 
This is in line with Lazarus' (1976) multi-modal hypothesis 
that the more modalities that are incorporated into a 
treatment program, the better the outcome. 
Another presupposition of this study has been that 
a complex interdependent relationship exists between en-
vironmental, behavioral, cognitive, and biological vari-
ables. What the data may be indicating is that skills 
training alone, may be insufficient to lead to a signif-
icant change in the subjects' belief systems. What might 
be needed to effect lasting significant belief system change 
may be the incorporation of additional modalities into the 
training process. This expansion of the focus of train-
ing might increase the impact of training on the network 
of interdependent variables. 
Parenthetically, it might be added that while the 
external subjects under the experimental I and II con-
ditions did not make a significant change in I-E (see 
Table 3), by inspection of Table 2, it can be seen that 
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their posttest means changed in the predicted direction and 
their mean change scores were greater than the external 
subjects under the control I and II conditions. In re-
gards to Dg, although there was no significant change in 
Dg levels under any condition (see Table 5), Table 4 in-
dicates that the experimental subjects' posttest means 
and mean change scores moved more in the predicted direc-
tion than those of the control subjects. Similarly with 
the S-E data, while a near-significant change in S-E oc-
curred independent of the subjects' condition (see Table 8), 
by inspection of Table 7, it can be seen that the posttest 
means and mean change scores of the experimental I and II 
subjects moved more in the predicted direction than the 
control I and II subjects' scores. It is important to 
stress that while none of these differences were signif-
icant and may be due to chance, they were in the predicted 
direction and may be reflecting the relative though in-
sufficient positive effect of skills training on the sub-
jects' belief systems. 
In regards to the two categories of belief system 
data, the results on structural aspects provide very strong 
evidence for the internal consistency of belief systems. 
That is, the different levels of I-E, Dg, and S-E tend to 
cluster together according to theoretical expectations. 
However, with one exception, none of the change in belief 
system hypotheses were confirmed. While the reasons for 
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this stability are not clear, several possible factors 
were suggested. It appears that while skills training 
is effective in influencing behavioral change, it may not 
be sufficient to make significant changes in belief sys-
tems or, at least, it may take longer to make a signif-
icant shift in generalized beliefs than anticipated within 
the design of this research. 
Summary and Conclusions 
The results of this study tend to generate more 
questions than answers. The data indicates that inter-
personal skills training resulted in a significant increase 
in social functioning. In addition to this, the internal 
consistency of belief systems was also supported. How-
ever, the three assessed components of belief systems do 
not appear to differentially mediate interpersonal func-
tioning. Moreover, skills training does not appear suf-
ficient to influence those three components. 
Although these results tend to indicate that sig-
nificant behavior change does not lead to significant be-
lief system change, because of various design and methodo-
logical factors, this conclusion may not be valid. To 
clarify some of the issues raised in this study, future 
studies might include more situation-specific measures of 
belief as well as more global scales. This would help 
answer the "orders of abstraction" question as well as 
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further explore the structural and change aspects of be-
lief systems. In addition to this, a long-term posttest 
assessment would not only further probe the relationship 
between change and stability but might also settle the in-
sufficient time issue. Some measure of interpersonal be-
havior in non-training situations may also serve to 
clarify the relationship between behavior and belief. By 
the same token, some assessment of interpersonal relation-
ships and the reactions of significant others to increased 
social functioning may shed some light on the relationship 
between interpersonal systems, belief systems, and be-
havior change. Finally, training groups which vary in the 
number of modalities that they focused on might facilitate 
understanding of what might constitute a sufficient inter-
vention. 
The experimenter would like to suggest that there 
are no panaceas and that no one approach to training or 
treatment is likely to be totally sufficient. Given the 
proposed network of complex interdependent relationships 
and the ecological nature of the change process, it is 
probably better to make direct interventions at the nodal 
point of any system. That is, the place at which the 
maximum nunber of functions essential to the existence of 
the system converge, and which, if modified, result in 
maximum systemic change (Bertalanffy, 1968). In other 
words, if the nodal point within a particular system 
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happened to be the individual's belief system then a 
cognitively oriented approach might be stressed. If, 
however, the nodal point happened to be in some other 
modality then interventions could be directed at that site. 
The importance of this, is that by increasing our aware-
ness of the significant processes that are involved in the 
maintenance and change of any system, we, as people-helpers, 
can make more effective interventions, and thereby help 
ourselves and others to fully utilize our human resources. 
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APPENDIX A 
* SCALES FOR ASSESSMENT OF INTERPERSONAL FUNCTIONING 
SCALE 1 
EMPATHETIC UNDERSTANDING IN INTERPERSONAL 
PROCESSES: A SCALE FOR MEASUREMENT 
Level 1 
The verbal and behavioral expressions of the first 
person either do not attend or detract significantly from 
the verbal and behavioral expressions of the second person(s) 
in that they communicate significantly less of the second 
person's feelings than the second person has communicated 
himself. 
Examples: The first person communicates no awareness of 
even the most obvious, expressed surface feelings 
of the second person. The first person may be 
bored or uninterested or simply operating from a 
preconceived frame of reference which totally ex-
cluded that of the other person(s). 
In summary, the first person does everything but ex-
press that he is listening, understanding, or being sensitive 
to even the feelings of the other person in such a way to 
detract significantly from the communications of the second 
person. 
Level 2 
While the first person responds to the expressed 
feelings of the second person(s), he does so in such a way 
that he subtracts noticeable affect from the communications 
of the second person. 
Examples: The first person may communicate some awareness 
* 
of obvious surface feelings of the second person, 
but his communications drain off a level of the af-
·fect and distort the level of meaning. The first 
person may communicate his own ideas of what may 
From Car.khuff (1969b). 
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be going on, but these are not congruent with the 
expressions of the second person. 
In summary, the first person tends to respond to 
other than what the second person is expressing or indicatin~ 
Level 3 
The expressions of the first person in response to 
the expressed feelings of the second person(s) are essen-
tially interchangeable with those of the second person in 
that they express essentially the same affect and meaning. 
Example: The first person responds with accurate under-
standing of the surface feelings of the second 
person but may not respond to or may misinterpret 
the deeper feelings. 
In summary, the first person is responding so as to 
neither subtract from nor add to the expressions of the 
second person; but he does not respond accurately to how 
that person really feels beneath the surface feelings. 
Level 3 constitutes the minimal level of facilitative inter-
personal functioning. 
Level 4 
The responses of the first person add noticeably to 
the expressions of the second person(s) in such a way as to 
express feelings a level deeper than the second person was 
able to express himself. 
Example: The facilitator communicates his understanding of 
the expressions of the second person at a level 
deeper than they were expressed, and thus enables 
the second person to experience and/or express 
feelings he was unable to express previously. 
In summary, the facilitator's responses add deeper 
feeling and meaning to the expressions of the second person. 
Level 5 
The first person's responses add significantly to 
the feeling and meaning of the expressions of the second 
person (s) in Sl1.ch a way as to (1) accurately express feel-
ings levels below what the person himself was able to express 
or (2) in the event of on going deep self-exploration on the 
second person's part, to be fully with him in his deepest 
moments. 
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Example: The facilitator responds with accuracy to all of 
the person's deeper as well as surface feelings. 
He is "together" with the second person or "tuned 
in" on his wave length. The facilitator and the 
other person might proceed together to explore 
previously unexplored areas of human existence. 
In summary, the facilitator is responding with a 
full awareness of who the other person is and a comprehen-
sive and accurate empathic understanding of his deepest 
feelings. 
SCALE 2 
THE COMMUNICATION OF RESPECT IN INTERPERSONAL 
PROCESSES: A SCALE FOR MEASUREMENT 
Level 1 
The verbal and behavioral expressions of the first 
person communicate a clear lack of respect (or negative re-
gard) for the second person(s). 
Example: The first person communicates to the second person 
that the second person's feelings and experiences 
are not worthy of consideration or that the second 
person is not capable of acting constructively. 
The first person may become the sole focus of 
evaluation. 
In summary, in many ways the first person communi-
cates total lack of respect for the feelings, experiences, 
and potentials of the second person. 
Level 2 
The first person responds to the second person in 
such a way as to communicate little respect for the feel-
ings, and potentials of the second person. 
Example: The first person may respond mechanically or pas-
sively or ignore many of the feelings of the 
second person. 
In summary, in many ways the first person displays 
a lack of respect or concern for the second person's feel-
ings, experiences, and potentials. 
Level 3 
The first person communicates a positive respect and 
concern for the second person's feelings, experiences, and 
potentials. 
Example: The first person communicates respect and concern 
for the second person's ability to express himself 
and to deal constructively with his life situation. 
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In summary, inmanyways the first person communicates 
that who the second person is and what he does matter to the 
first person. Level 3 constitutes the minimal level of 
facilitative interpersonal functioning. 
Level 4 
The facilitator clearly communicates a very deep 
respect and concern for the second person. 
Example: The facilitator's responses enables the second 
person to feel free to be himself and to experi-
ence being valued as an individual. 
In summary, the facilitator communicates a very deep 
caring for the feelings, experiences, and potentials of the 
second person. 
Level 5 
The facilitator communicates the very deepest re-
spect for the second person's worth as a person and his 
potential as a free individual. 
Example: The facilitator cares very deeply for the human 
potentials of the second person. 
In summary, the facilitator is committed to the 
value of the other person as a human being. 
SCALE 3 
FACILITATIVE GENUINENESS IN INTERPERSONAL 
PROCESSES: A SCALE FOR MEASUREMENT 
Level 1 
The first person's verbalizations are clearly unre-
lated to what he is feeling at the moment, or his only gen-
uine responses are negative in regard to the second person(s) 
and appear to have a totally destructive effect upon the 
second person. 
Example: The first person may be defensive in his inter-
action with the second person(s) and this defen-
siveness may be demonstrated in the content of his 
words or his voice quality. Where he is defensive 
he does not employ his reaction as a basis for 
potentially valuable inquiry into the relationship. 
In summary, there is evidence of a considerable dis-
crepancy between the inner experiencing of the first per-
son(s) and his current verbalizations. Where there is no 
discrepancy, the first person's reactions are employed 
solely in a destructive fashion. 
Level 2 
The first person's verbalizations are slightly unre-
lated to what he is feeling at the moment, or when his re-
sponses are genuine they are negative in regard to the sec-
ond person; the first person does not appear to know how to 
employ his negative reactions constructively as a basis for 
inquiry into the relationship. 
Example: The first person may respond to the second per-
son(s) in a "professional" manner that has a re-
hearsed quality or a quality concerning the way a 
helper "should" respond in that situation. 
In summary, the first person is usually responding 
according to his prescribed role rather than expressing what 
he personally feels or means. When he is genuine his re-
sponses are negative and he is unable to employ them as a 
basis for further inquiry. 
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Level 3 
The first person provides no "negative" cues between 
what he says and what he feels, but he provides no positive 
clues to indicate a really genuine response to the second 
person(s). 
Example: The first person may listen and follow the second 
person(s) but commits nothing more of himself. 
In summary, the first person appears to make appro-
priate responses that do not seen insincere but that do not 
reflect any real involvement either. Level 3 constitutes 
the minimal level of facilitative interpersonal functioning. 
Level 4 
The facilitator presents some positive cues indi-
cating a genuine response (whether positive or negative) in 
a nondestructive manner to the second person(s). 
Example: The facilitator's expressions are congruent with 
his feelings, although he may be somewhat hesitant 
about expressing them fully. 
In summary, the facilitator responds with many of 
his own feelings, and there is no doubt as to whether he 
really means what he says. He is able to employ his re-
sponses, whatever their emotional content, as a basis for 
further inquiry into the relationship. 
Level 5 
The facilitator is freely and deeply himself in a 
nonexploitative relationship with the second person(s). 
Example: The facilitator is completely spontaneous in his 
interaction and open to experiences of all types, 
both pleasant and hurtful. In the event of hurt-
ful responses the facilitator's comments are em-
ployed constructively to open a further area of 
inquiry for both the facilitator and the second 
person. 
In summary, the facilitator is clearly being himself 
and yet employing his own genuine responses constructively. 
SCALE 4 
FACILITATIVE SELF-DISCLOSURE IN INTERPERSONAL 
PROCESSES: A SCALE FOR MEASUREMENT 
Level 1 
The first person actively attempts to remain de-
tached from the second person(s) and discloses nothing about 
his own feelings or personality to the second person(s), or 
if he does disclose himself, he does so in a way that is not 
tuned to the second person's general progress. 
Example: The first person may attempt, whether awkwardly or 
skillfully to divert the second person's attention 
from focusing upon personal questions concerning 
the first person, or his self-disclosures may be 
ego shattering for the second person(s) and may 
ultimately cause him to lose faith in the first 
person. 
In summary, the first person actively attempts to 
remain ambiguous and an unknown quantity to the second per-
son(s), or if he is self-disclosing, he does so solely out 
of his own needs and is oblivious to the needs of the sec-
ond person(s). 
Level 2 
The first person, while not always appearing 
actively to avoid self-disclosures, never volunteers per-
sonal information about himself. 
Example: The first person may respond briefly to direct 
questions from the client about himself; however, 
he does so hesitantly and never provides more in-
formation about himself than the second person(s) 
specifically requests. 
In summary, the second person(s) either does not ask 
about the personality of the first person, or, if he does, 
the barest minimum of brief, vague, and superficial re-
sponses are offered by the first person. 
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Level 3 
The first person volunteers personal information 
about himself which may be in keeping with the second per-
son's interests, but this information is often vague and in-
dicates little about the unique character of the first per-
son. 
Example: While the first person volunteers personal infor-
mation and never gives the impression that he does 
not wish to disclose more about himself, neverthe-
less, the content of his verbalizations is gen-
erally centered upon his reactions to the second 
person(s) and his ideas concerning their inter-
action. 
In summary, the first person may introduce more ab-
stract, personal ideas in accord with the second person's 
interests, but these ideas do not stamp him as a unique per-
son. Level 3 constitutes the minimum level of facilitative 
interpersonal functioning. 
Level 4 
The facilitator freely volunteers information about 
his personal ideas, attitudes, and experiences in accord 
with the second person's interests and concerns. 
Example: The facilitator may discuss personal ideas in both 
depth and detail, and his expressions reveal him 
to be a unique individual. 
In summary, the facilitator is free and spontaneous 
in volunteering personal information about himself, and in 
so doing may reveal in a constructive fashion quite intimate 
material about his own feelings, and beliefs. 
Level 5 
The facilitator volunteers very intimate and often 
detailed material about his own personality, and in keeping 
with the second person's needs may express information that 
might be extremely embarrassing under different circum-
stances or if revealed by the second person to an outsider. 
Example: The facilitator gives the impression of holding 
nothing back and of disclosing his feelings and 
ideas fully and completely to the second person(s). 
If some of his feelings are negative concerning the 
second person(s), the facilitator employes them 
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constructively as a basis for an open-ended in-
quiry. 
In summary, the facilitator is operating in a con-
structive fashion at the most intimate levels of self-
disclosure. 
SCALE 5 
PERSONALLY RELEVANT CONCRETENESS OR SPECIFICITY 
OF EXPRESSION IN INTERPERSONAL PROCESSES: 
A SCALE FOR MEASUREMENT 
Level 1 
The first person leads or allows all discussion with 
the second person(s) to deal only with vague and anonymous 
generalities. 
Example: The first person and the second person discuss 
everything on strictly an abstract and highly in-
tellectual level. 
In summary, the first person makes no attempt to 
lead the discussion into the realm of personally relevant 
specific situations and feelings. 
Level 2 
The first person frequently leads or allows even dis-
cussions of material personally relevant to the second per-
son(s) to be dealt with on a vague and abstract level. 
Example: The first person and the second person may discuss 
the "real" feelings but they do so at an abstract, 
intellectualized level. 
In summary, the first person does not elicit dis-
cussions of most personally relevant feelings and experiences 
in specific and concrete terms. 
Level 3 
The first person at times enables the second per-
son(s) to discuss personally relevant materials in specific 
and concrete terminology. 
Example: The first person will make it possible for the 
discussion with the second person(s) to center 
directly around most things that are personally 
important to the second person(s), although there 
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will continue to be areas not dealt with concretely 
and areas in which the second person does not de-
velop fully in specificity. 
In summary, the first person sometimes guides the 
discussions into consideration of personally relevant spe-
cific and concrete instances, but these are not always fully 
developed. Level 3 constitutes the minimal level of facili-
tative functioning. 
Level 4 
The facilitator is frequently helpful in enabling 
the second person(s) to fully develop in concrete and spe-
cific terms almost all instances of concern. 
Example: The facilitator is able on many occasions to guide 
the discussion to specific feelings and experi-
ences of personally meaningful material. 
In summary, the facilitator is very helpful in en-
abling the discussion to center around specific and concrete 
instances of most important and personally relevant feelings 
and experiences. 
Level 5 
The facilitator is always helpful in guiding the dis-
cussion, so that the second person(s) may discuss fluently, 
directly, and completely specific feelings and experiences. 
Example: The first person involves the second person in 
discussion of specific feelings, situations, and 
events, regardless of their emotional content. 
In summary, the facilitator facilitates a direct ex-
pression of all personally relevant feelings and experiences 
in concrete and specific terms. 
SCALE 6 
CONFRONTATION IN INTERPERSONAL PROCESSES: 
A SCALE FOR MEASUREMENT 
Level 1 
The verbal and behavioral expressions of the helper 
disregard the discrepancies in the helpee's behavior (ideal 
versus real self, insight versus action, helper versus 
helpee's experiences). 
Example: The helper may simply ignore all helpee discrep-
ancies by passively accepting them. 
In summary, the helper simply disregards all of 
those discrepancies in the helpee's behavior that might be 
fruitful areas for consideration. 
Level 2 
The verbal and behavioral expressions of the helper 
disregard the discrepancies in the helpee's behavior. 
Example: The helper, although not explicitly accepting 
these discrepancies, may simply remain silent con-
cerning most of them. 
In summary, the helper disregards the discrepancies 
in the helpee's behavior, and, thus, potentially important 
areas of inquiry. 
Level 3 
The verbal and behavioral expressions of the helper, 
while open to discrepancies in the helpee's behavior, do not 
relate directly and specifically to these discrepancies. 
Example: The helper may simply raise questions without 
pointing up the diverging directions of the pos-
sible answers. 
In summary, while the helper does not disregard dis-
crepancies in the helpee's behavior, he does not point up 
the directions of these discrepancies. Level 3 constitutes 
the minimum level of facilitative interpersonal functioning. 
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Level 4 
The verbal and behavioral expressions of the helper 
attend directly and specifically to the discrepancies in the 
helpee's behavior. 
Example: The helper confronts the helpee directly and ex-
plicitly with discrepancies in the helpee's be-
havior. 
In summary, the helper specifically addresses him-
self to discrepancies in the helpee's behavior. 
Level 5 
The verbal and behavioral expressions of the helper 
are keenly and continually attuned to the discrepancies in 
the helpee's behavior. 
Example: The helper confronts the helpee with helpee dis-
crepancies in a sensitive and perceptive manner 
whenever they appear. 
In summary, the helper does not neglect any poten-
tially fruitful inquiry into the discrepancies in the 
helpee's behavior. 
SCALE 7 
IMMEDIACY OF RELATIONSHIP IN INTERPERSONAL 
PROCESSES: A SCALE FOR MEASUREMENT 
Level 1 
The verbal and behavioral expressions of the helper 
disregard the content and affect of the helpee's expressions 
that have the potential for relating to the helper. 
Example: The helper may simply ignore all helpee communica-
tions, whether direct or indirect, that deal with 
the helper-helpee relationship. 
In summary, the helper simply disregards all of 
those helpee messages that are related to the helper. 
Level 2 
The verbal and behavioral expressions of the helper 
disregard most of the helpee expressions that have the 
potential for relating to the helper. 
Example: Even if the helpee is talking about helping per-
sonnel in general, the helper may, in general, re-
main silent or 'just not relate the content to him-
self. 
In summary, the helper appears to choose to disre-
gard most of those helpee messages that are related to the 
helper. 
Level 3 
The verbal and behavior expressions of the helper, 
while open to interpretations of immediacy, do not relate 
what the helpee is saying to what is going on between the 
helper and the helpee in the immediate moment. 
Example: The helper may make literal responses to or re-
flections on the helpee's expressions or otherwise 
open-minded responses that refer to no one specif-
ically but that might refer to the helper. 
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In summary, while the helper does not extend the 
helpee's expressions to immediacy, he is not closed to such 
interpretations. Level 3 constitutes the minimum level of 
facilitative interpersonal functioning. 
Level 4 
The verbal and behavioral expressions of the helper 
appear cautiously to relate the helpee's expressions 
directly to the helper-helpee relationship. 
Example: The helper attempts to relate the helpee's re-
sponses to himself, but he does so in a tentative 
manner. 
In summary, the helper relates the helpee's responses 
to himself in an open, cautious manner. 
Level 5 
The verbal and behavioral expressions of the helper 
relate the helpee's expressions directly to the helper-
helpee relationship. 
Example: The helper in a direct and explicit manner relates 
the helpee's expressions to himself. 
In summary, the helper is not hesitant in making 
explicit interpretations of the helper-helpee relationship.' 
SCALE 8 
HELPEE SELF-EXPLORATION IN INTERPERSONAL 
PROCESSES: A SCALE FOR MEASUREMENT 
Level 1 
The second person does not discuss personally rele-
vant material, either because he has had no opportunity to 
do such or because he is actively evading the discussion 
even when it is introduced by the first person. 
Example: The second person avoids any self-descriptions or 
self-exploration or direct expression of feelings 
that would lead him to reveal himself to the first 
person. 
In summary, for a variety of possible reasons the 
second person does not give any evidence of self-exploration. 
Level 2 
The second person responds with discussion to the in-
troduction of personally relevant material by the first per-
son but does so in a mechanical manner and without the dem-
onstration of emotional feelings. 
Example: The second person simply discusses the material 
without exploring the significance or the meaning 
of the material or attempting further exploration 
of that feeling in an effort to uncover related 
feelings or material. 
In summary, the second person responds mechanically 
and remotely to the introduction of personally relevant 
material by the first person. 
Level 3 
The second person voluntarily introduces discussions 
of personally relevant material but does so in a mechanical 
manner and without the demonstration of emotional feeling. 
Example: The emotional remoteness and mechanical manner of 
the discussion give the discussion a quality of 
being rehearsed. 
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In summary, the second person introduces personally 
relevant material but does so without spontaneity or emo-
tional proximity and without an inward probing to discover 
new feelings and experiences. 
Level 4 
The second person voluntarily introduces discussions 
of personally relevant material with both spontaneity and 
emotional proximity. 
Example: The voice quality and other characteristics of the 
second person are very much "with" the feelings 
and other personal materials that are being 
verbalized. 
In summary, the second person introduces personally 
relevant discussions with spontaneity and emotional proximity 
but without a distinct tendency toward inward probing to 
discover new feelings and experiences. 
Level 5 
The second person actively and spontaneously engages 
in an inward probing to discover new feelings and experi-
ences about himself and his world. 
Example: The second person is searching to discover new 
feelings concerning himself and his world even 
though at the moment he may perhaps be doing so 
fearfully and tentatively. 
In summary, the second person is fully and actively 
focusing upon himself and exploring himself and his world. 
APPENDIX B 
* Rating Guide for the Interpersonal Skills Scale 
Sample Statement: "I'm so down and I don't even know why 
••• I mean, I shouldn't be down just 
because ••• (pause) there's just no 
reason for it." 
Response Classification Level Rating 
(refer to above statement for all examples) 
1. Cliche Response: Not related to other's statement. 1.0 
e.g., "I know lots of people who get sad feelings 
too." 
Cliche Response: Somewhat related to other's 
statement. 
e.g., "What do you think causes people to get 
depressed?" 
1.5 
2. Advice Response: Poor advice: no understanding. 2.0 
e.g., "You should think of the good things in 
your life." 
Advice Response: Good advice: no understanding. 2.5 
e.g., "You know what's on your mind. Just say it!" 
3. Interchangeable Response: Simple reflective with 
understanding shown. 3.0 
e.g., "You• re feeling down." 
Interchangeable Response: Complete understanding 
of feeling and message 
of other. 3.5 
e.g., "You're pretty down and you just don't know 
why." 
4. Additive Response: High understanding1 beginning 
initiation. 4.0 
e.g., "You can't let yourself think about the 
things that are causing you to feel so bad." 
Additive Response: High Understanding1 high 
initiation. 4.5 
e.g., "You're feeling really low ••• you have 
an idea why • • • but its pretty painful to 
think about it.• 
* '!'his scale is based on the work of Carkhuff 
(1969b). 
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APPENDIX C 
* Interpersonal Skills: A Rating Scale 
Use the following rating scale to rate interpersonal skills: 
1.0 I 1.5 
Very Sub-
tractive 
I 2.0 I 2.5 I 3.0 I 3.5 I 4.0 I 4.5 
Moderately Minimally Markedly 
Subtractive facilita- facilita-
tive tive 
Self-presentation Skills: 
I 5.0 I 
Extremely 
Facilita-
tive 
Self-disclosure: Trainee appropriately discloses him-
self to others with the goal of fostering relationships. 
This is done in a sense of mutuality and emerges from 
the ongoing context of the relationship. 
Concreteness: 
and behavior; 
telling"); he 
instances 
He deals in specific, concrete feelings 
he deals in relevant behavior (not "story-
deals in specific details and specific 
Expression of feeling: He expresses his emotions as 
they arise in a constructive non-manipulative manner; 
directly communicating his feelings. 
Responding Skills: 
Primary Accurate Empathy: Trainee communicates an ac-
curate understanding of the feelings, behavior, and ex-
periences which the other person explicitly communicates. 
He experiences the "world" of the other and communicates 
this understanding. 
Genuineness: He responds in a spontaneous, role-free 
manner. He is assertive in communicating without being 
duly aggressive. 
Respect: (warmth, being "for"): He communicates re-
spect for the other person (especially through his ef-
forts to understand the other person's experience). He 
is unconditional or conditional in his regard as the 
phase and content of the relationship demands. 
* This scale is based on the work of Egan (1976). 
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Challenge Skills: 
Advanced Accurate Empathy: Trainee accurately communi-
cates not only what the other person states and expresses 
but also what he implies or leaves unstated or doesn't 
clearly express. 
Confrontation: He invites the other person to examine 
his behavior and its consequences more carefully; he 
challenges the strengths rather than the weaknesses of 
the other; he points out the discrepancies in the 
other's lifestyle. 
Immediacy: He explores the here-and-now, the relation-
ship between himself and others, in a direct and con-
structive manner. 
APPENDIX D 
THE ROTTER INTERNAL-EXTERNAL LOCUS 
* OF CONTROL SCALE 
Instructions: Please check the alternative that best de-
scribes what happens to you or how you feel. There are no 
right or wrong answers. 
1. A. Children get into trouble because their parents 
punish them too much. 
B. The trouble with most children nowadays is that 
their parents are too easy with them. 
2. A. Many of the unhappy things in people's lives are 
partly due to bad luck. 
B. People's misfortunes result from the mistakes 
they make. 
3. A. One of the major reasons why we have wars is be-
cause people don't take enough interest in poli-
tics. 
B. There will always be wars, no matter how hard 
people try to prevent them. 
4. A. In the long run people get the respect they de-
serve in this world. 
B. Unfortunately, an individual's worth often passes 
unrecognized no matter how hard he tries. 
5. A. The idea that teachers are unfair to students is 
nonsense. 
B. Most students don't realize the extent to which 
their grades are influenced by accidental hap-
penings. 
6. A. Without the right breaks one cannot be an effec-
tive leader. 
B. Capable people who fail to become leaders have 
not taken advantage of their opportunities. 
7. A. No matter how hard you try some people just don't 
like you. 
B. People who can't get others to like them don't 
understand how to get along with others. 
* From Rotter (1966). 
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8. A. Heredity plays the major role in determining 
one's personality. 
B. It is one's experiences in life which determine 
what they're like. 
9. A. I have often found that what is going to happen 
will happen. 
B. Trusting to fate has never turned out as well 
for me as making a decision to take a definite 
course of action. 
10. A. In the case of the well prepared student there 
is rarely if ever such a thing as an unfair test. 
B. Many times exam questions tend to be so unre-
lated to course work that studying is really 
useless. 
11. A. Becoming a success is a matter of hard work; 
luck has little or nothing to do with it. 
B. Getting a good job depends mainly on being in 
the right place at the right time. 
12. A. The average citizen can have an influence in 
government decisions. 
B. This world is run by the few people in power, 
and there is not much the little guy can do 
about it. 
13. A. When I make plans, I am almost certain that I 
can make them work. 
B. It is not always wise to plan too far ahead be-
cause many things turn out to be a matter of 
good or bad fortune anyhow. 
14. A. 
---B. 
There are certain people who are just no good. 
There is some good in everybody. 
15. A. In my case getting what I want has little or 
nothing to do with luck. 
B. Many times we might just as well decide what to 
do by flipping a coin. 
16. A. Who gets to be boss often depends on who was 
lucky enough to be in the right place first. 
B. Getting people to do the right thing depends 
upon ability; luck has little or nothing to do 
with it. 
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17. A. As far as world affairs are concerned, most of 
us are the victims of forces we can neither un-
derstand, nor control. 
B. By taking an active part in political and social 
affairs the people can control world events. 
18. A. Most people don't realize the extent to which 
their lives are controlled by accidental happen-
ings. 
B. There really is no such thing as "luck." 
19. A. One should always be willing to admit mistakes. 
---B. It is usually best to cover up one's mistakes. 
20. A. It is hard to know whether or not a person 
really likes you. 
B. How many friends you have depends upon how nice 
a person you are. 
21. A. In the long run the bad things that happen to us 
are balanced by the good ones. 
B. Most misfortunes are the result of lack of 
ability, ignorance, laziness, or all three. 
22. A. With enough effort we can wipe out political 
corruption. · 
B. It is difficult for people to have much control 
over the things politicians do in office. 
23. A. Sometimes I can't understand how teachers arrive 
at the grades they give. 
B. There is a direct connection between how hard I 
study and the grades I get. 
24. A. A good leader expects people to decide for them-
selves what they should do. 
B. A good leader makes it clear to everybody what 
their jobs are. 
25. A. Many times I feel that I have little influence 
over the things that happen to me. 
B. It is impossible for me to believe that chance 
or luck plays an important role in my life. 
26. A. People are lonely because they don't try to be 
friendly. 
B. There's not much use in trying too hard to please 
people, if they like you, they like you. 
27. A. 
B. 
28. A. 
---B. 
29. A. 
B. 
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There is too much emphasis on athletics in high 
school. 
Team sports are an excellent way to build 
character. 
What happens to me is my own doing. 
Sometimes I feel that I don't have enough con-
trol over the direction my life is taking. 
Most of the time I can't understand why politi-
cians behave the way they do. 
In the long run the people are responsible for 
bad government on a national as well as on a 
local level. 
APPENDIX E 
THE ROKEACH DOGMATISM SCALE* 
Directions: Please answer all questions. There are no 
right or wrong answers. Select the number 
for the response which best represents your 
attitude or belief. 
+3 Strongly 
agree 
-2 Moderately 
disagree 
+2 Moderately 
agree 
-3 Strongly 
disagree 
+1 Agree -1 Disagree 
1. The United States and Russia have just about 
nothing in common. 
2. The highest form of government is a democracy and 
the highest form of democracy is a government run 
by those who are most intelligent. 
3. Even though freedom of speech for all groups is a 
worthwhile goal, it is unfortunately necessary to 
restrict the freedom of certain political groups. 
4. It is only natural that a person would have a much 
--- better acquaintance with ideas he believes in than 
with ideas he opposes. 
5. Man on his own is a helpless and miserable creature. 
6. Fundamentally, the world we live 1n is a pretty 
lonesome place. 
7. Most people just don't give a "damn" for others. 
8. I'd like it if I could find someone who would tell 
me how to solve my personal problems. 
9. It is only natural for a person to be rather fear-
ful of the future. 
10. There is so much to be done and so little time to 
do it in. 
11. Once I get wound up in a heated discussion I just 
can't stop. 
12. In a discussion I often find it necessary to 
*From Rokeach (1960) • 
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repeat myself several times to make sure I am being 
understood. 
13. In a heated discussion I generally become so ab-
sorbed in what I am going to say that I forget to 
listen to what others are saying. 
14. It is better to be a dead hero than a live coward. 
15. While I don't like to admit this even to myself, 
my secret ambition is to become a great man, like 
Einstein, or Beethoven, or Shakespeare. 
16. The main thing in life is for a person to want to 
do something important. 
17. If given the chance I would do something of great 
benefit to the world. 
18. In the history of mankind there have probably been 
just a handful of really great thinkers. 
19. There are a number of people I have come to hate 
because of the things they stand for. 
20. A man who does not believe in some great cause has 
not really lived. 
21. It is only when a person devotes himself to an 
ideal or cause that life becomes meaningful. 
22. Of all the different philosophies which exist in 
this world there is probably only one which is 
correct. 
23. A person who gets enthusiastic about too many 
causes is likely to be a pretty "wishy-washy" 
sort of person. 
24. To compromise with our political opponents is 
dangerous because it usually leads to the betrayal 
of our own side. 
25. When it comes to differences of opinion in religion 
we must be careful not to compromise with those 
who believe differently from the way we do. 
26. In times like these, a person must be pretty selfish 
if he considers primarily his own happiness. 
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27. The worst crime a person could commit is to attack 
publicly the people who believe in the same things 
he does. 
28. In times like these it is often necessary to be 
more on guard against ideas put out by people or 
groups in one's own camp than by those in the op-
posing camp. 
29. A group which tolerates too many differences of 
opinion among its own members cannot exist for 
long. 
30. There are two kinds of people in this world: those 
who are for the truth and those who are against the 
truth. 
31. My blood boils whenever a person stubbornly re-
fuses to admit he's wrong. 
32. A person who thinks primarily of his own happiness 
is beneath contempt. 
33. Most of the ideas which get printed nowadays aren't 
worth the paper they are printed on. 
34. In this complicated world of ours the only way we 
can know what's going on is to rely on leaders or 
experts who can be tursted. 
35. It is often desirable to reserve judgment about 
what's going on until one has had a chance to hear 
the opinions of those one respects. 
36. In the long run the best way to live is to pick 
friends and associates whose tastes and beliefs are 
the same as one's own. 
37. The present is all too often full of unhappiness. 
It is only the future that counts. 
38. If a man is to accomplish his mission in life it 
is sometimes necessary to gamble "all or nothing 
at all." 
39. Unfortunately a good many people with whom I have 
discussed important social and moral problems don't 
really understand what's going on. 
40. Most people just don't know what's good for them. 
APPENDIX F 
THE REVISED JANIS-FIELD SCALE* 
Directions: Please answer all questions. There are no 
right or wrong answers. Place the number in 
the blank for each question which best de-
scribes your experience or feelings. Wording 
for responses should be adjusted to fit each 
question. 
e.g. 1--Very 
often 
2--Fairly 
often 
5--Practically never 
3--Sometimes 4--0nce in a 
great while 
1. How often do you have the feeling that there is 
nothing you can do well? 
2. When you have to talk in front of a class or a 
group of people your own age, how afraid or worried 
do you usually feel? (e.g, very afraid) 
3. How often do you worry about whether other people 
like to be with you? 
4. How often do you feel self-conscious? 
5. How often are you troubled with shyness? 
6. How often do you feel inferior to most of the 
people you know? 
7. Do you ever think that you are a worthless in-
dividual? 
8. How much do you worry about how well you get along 
with other people? 
9. How often do you feel that you dislike yourself? 
10. Do you ever feel so discouraged with yourself 
that you wonder whether anything is worthwhile? 
11. How often do you feel that you have handled your-
self well at a social gathering? 
12. How often do you have the feeling that you can do 
everything well? 
*From Eagley (1967). 
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13. When you talk in front of a class or a group of 
people of your own age, how pleased are you with 
your performance? (e.g., very pleased) 
14. How comfortable are you when starting a conversa-
tion with people whom you don't know? (e.g., very 
comfortable) 
15. How often do you feel that you are a successful 
person? 
16. How confident are you that your success in your 
future job or career is assured? (e.g., very 
confident) 
17. When you speak in a class discussion how sure of 
yourself do you feel? 
18. How sure of yourself do you feel when among 
strangers? 
19. How confident do you feel that some day the people 
you know will look up to you and respect you? 
20. In general, how confident do you feel about your 
abilities? 
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